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Note: Transcendental Meditation and the Meaning of
Religion Under the Establishment Clause*
Transcendental Meditation (TM) is an effective relaxation tech-
nique that involves "thinking" a special sound, or "mantra."' Intro-
duced into the United States less than twenty years ago, TM has
achieved a remarkable degree of popularity and scientific approval.
As a consequence, both TM and its underlying theory, the Science
of Creative Intelligence (SCI),2 have gained substantial support from
private institutions and governmental agencies. Despite this wide-
spread acceptance, governmental sponsorship of TM programs has
drawn severe criticism from those who have labeled TM religious on
the basis of its resemblance to various Hindu practices.' At least two
lawsuits have claimed that government support of SCI/TM violates
the constitutional prohibition of religious establishment.'
* Thanks are extended to Professor J. Morris Clark of the University of Minnesota
Law School, who suggested the topic, and to attorneys Michael J. Woodruff and Julius
B. Poppinga, who provided helpful unpublished material.
1. TM is practiced twice daily, fifteen to twenty minutes at a time, and is said
to enable the nervous system to achieve a deep state of wakeful rest. The mantra is a
Sanskrit word selected for the meditator by his teacher on the basis of a perceived
relationship between its sound and the meditator's personality. For further discussion
of mantras and TM generally, see notes 83-106 & 121-22 infra and accompanying text.
"Transcendental Meditation" and its acronym "TM" do not refer to mantric
meditation generally but rather to a specific practice introduced to the West by Ma-
harishi Mahesh Yogi, an Indian guru. See note 95 infra and accompanying text. Both
terms are service marks of the World Plan Executive Council, the chief TM organiza-
tion. See also note 146 infra.
2. The term "Science of Creative Intelligence" reportedly originated in 1969 with
Jack Forem, who was teaching a college course on the principles of TM and wanted
an academic-sounding title for it. See J. FOaEM, TRANcENDENTAL MEDrrATION 216
(1973). Both "Science of Creative Intelligence" and its acronym "SCI' are service
marks of the World Plan Executive Council.
3. See J. BJORNSTAD, THE TRANSCENDENTAL MIRAGE (1976); K. BOA, CULTS,
WoRLD RELIGIONS, AND YOU 156-66 (1977); J. HEFLEY, THE YoUTNAPPERS 59-76 (1977);
G. LEWIS, WHAT EVERYBODY SHouLD KNOW AEouT TRANScENDENTAL MEDITATION (1974);
L. McBETH, STRANGE NEW RELIGIONS 110-24 (1977); C. MILLER, TRANSCENDENTAL
HESITATION (1977); J. PATTON, THE CASE AGAiNSTTM INTHE SCHOOLS (1976); J. WELDON
& Z. LEvrrr, THE TRANSCENDENTAL EXPLOSION (1976); Fulton, Public Funding for TM?,
92 CHRISTIAN CENTURY 1124 (1975). Although much of the opposition to state promotion
of TM has come from fundamentalist Christian or Jewish groups, opposition has come
from nonsectarian sources as well. See, e.g., Transcendental Meditation Barred from
Public Schools, 30 CHURCH & ST. 243 (1977).
4. The Constitution forbids any "law respecting an establishment of religion."
U.S. CONST. amend. I. In 1976, a coalition of taxpayers, parents, and clergymen
brought suit to enjoin five New Jersey high schools from offering elective courses in
SCI and TM. See text accompanying notes 5-13 infra. A similar suit challenging the
teaching of TM was reportedly brought in California in 1975. See Fulton, supra note
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In the first case to rule on this question, Malnak v. Mahesh,5 a
federal district court considered the validity of a New Jersey public
high school program that offered an elective course entitled "The
Science of Creative Intelligence."' The classroom instructors were
neither certified nor paid by the schools, but were official TM teach-
ers brought in especially to teach the course. 7 Much of the course
involved discussion of a textbook teaching that Transcendental Med-
itation brings the meditator into direct contact with the "field of pure
creative intelligence."'8 This contact, according to the textbook,
"clarifies and strengthens the meditator's thoughts," " 'refines'
[his] nervous system," and "infuses [his] mind both with creativity
• . . and with 'all the qualities of creative intelligence,' " including
"truth," "happiness," and "fulfillment." 9 Once concepts such as
these had been introduced, classroom discussion was combined with
the daily practice of TM. In order to learnTM, each student had to
attend an initiation ceremony, or "puja," which was held on a week-
end and off the school premises. At the puja, the student's instructor
sang a Sanskrit chant and gave the student his mantra and his initial
instruction in TM.10 The chant invoked the names of Hindu gods and
of historical figures thought to be past masters of meditation." Al-
though the instructors were given an English translation of the chant,
there was no indication that a translation was given to the students.'"
On these facts, the court granted plaintiffs' motion for summary
judgment and held that the course violated the establishment clause
of the first amendment.' 3
The facts in Malnak required a shift away from the traditional
focus of establishment clause analysis. In prior cases, the religious
3, at 1124. Also, the Attorney General of Iowa was formally requested to proceed
against TM organizations on the ground that they were violating consumer fraud laws
by peddling religion under a secular label. See id.
5. 440 F. Supp. 1284 (D.N.J. 1977), appeal docketed, Nos. 78-1568, 78-1569 (3d
Cir. May 11, 1978).
6. Id. at 1289.
7. Id. Although the teachers were paid by the TM organizations and not the
schools, the programs did receive approximately $40,000 in federal aid. See Transcen-
dental Meditation Barred from Public Schools, supra note 3, at 243. The Department
of Health, Education, and Welfare, which authorized the aid, was named as a defen-
dant.
8. 440 F. Supp. at 1289.
9. Id. at 1289-90 (quoting the textbook).
10. Id. at 1305.
11. See id. at 1306-07.
12. See id. at 1306.
13. See id. at 1327. The court appeared to rest its holding on the finding that
the SCI/TM courses had a religious purpose, although it also indicated that the




nature of the challenged activities was clear," and the question of
legality therefore turned on the meaning of "establishment" rather
than the meaning of "religion." In Malnak, however, the issue was
whether a doctrine and practice that were not obviously religious and
that were asserted by proponents to be wholly secular should never-
theless be characterized as religious for the purposes of the establish-
ment clause.
The court, although recognizing the "novel aspects" of the case,
declined "to improvise an unprecedented definition of religion under
the first amendment."' 5 Rather, it looked to the "substantive charac-
teristics"'" of theories or practices deemed to be religious under prior
interpretations of the establishment clause and then drew analogies
between those characteristics and certain attributes of SC/TM. Spe-
cifically, the court likened TM's puja to a form of prayer and SCI's
concept of Creative Intelligence to the traditional concept of God.'"
Since it apparently was not disputed that the public schools were
promoting SCI/TM, these analogies compelled the conclusion that
teaching SCI/TM in the public schools was an establishment of reli-
gion.'8
In reaching its conclusion, the court offered several guidelines for
establishment clause analysis. First, it suggested that any workable
test for religion under the first amendment must focus on the sub-
stantive content of the belief or activity in question.'9 The court re-
jected defendants' argument that the controlling factor should be the
actual perceptions of those who adhere to the belief or participate in
the activity. The court reasoned that injecting such subjective char-
acterizations into the evaluation of beliefs and activities would
"preclude a fair and uniform standard."20 Second, the court noted
14. See note 34 infra.
15. 440 F. Supp. at 1320. In declaring such a definition "unprecedented," the
court was probably alluding to its earlier comment that "courts have avoided the
establishment of explicit criteria ... identif[ying] an activity as religious for pur-
poses of the first amendment." Id. at 1312. Whatever the court may have meant by
such a statement, attempts to explicate the legal meaning of religion have been numer-
ous. For some judicial efforts, see cases cited in L. TamE, AmEPmLCAN CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW 826-28 (1978); cases cited notes 46-48 infra. For some of the more noteworthy
scholarly efforts, see Dodge, The Free Exercise of Religion: A Sociological Approach,
67 MicH. L. REv. 679 (1969); Fernandez, The Free Exercise of Religion, 36 S. CAL. L.
REV. 546, 561 (1963); Note, Toward a Constitutional Definition of Religion, 91 HARv.
L. REv. 1056 (1978).
16. 440 F. Supp. at 1315.
17. See id. at 1320-23.
18. See id. at 1323.
19. See id. at 1315-17, 1321.
20. Id. at 1318. On the motion for summary judgment, defendants emphasized
that, whereas programs previously disapproved were clearly religious in nature, a
program in SCIMTM is not. See id. at 1315. The court considered this distinction at
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that prior establishment cases had invalidated programs that had
involved simply an invocation of "God," and therefore rejected the
defendants' assertion that certain institutional attributes such as
clergy, places of worship, and symbols are essential to religion.' Fi-
nally, the court indicated that "religion" under the establishment
clause, while revolving around the concept of a supreme being, is an
expansive concept that may encompass beliefs or activities ordinarily
considered nonreligious. For example, the court asserted that certain
moral values typically advanced by the government to promote secu-
lar societal goals might become religious if the government promoted
them as "divine law."2" According to the court, even atheism could
be a religion under the establishment clause if it dogmatically denied
the existence of a supreme being?2
In formulating these guidelines, the Malnak court seems to have
relied on its understanding of general establishment clause preced-
ent, its appreciation of the pragmatic difficulties of applying a uni-
form establishment clause standard, and its intuitive notion of what
constitutes religion. Absent from its analysis, however, was any ex-
plicit examination of the values underlying the establishment clause
or a coherent conceptual framework, rooted in those values, that
would explain why the elements it emphasized help to distinguish
religious from nonreligious belief-systems, why dissimilarities be-
tween SCI/TM and traditional religions were deemed irrelevant, or
whether other elements might be relevant in other contexts.
The court also left unclear the implications of its holding for
other programs that involve TM. The court seemed to strike down the
SCI/TM program on the basis of its express connection with the
concept of a god-like Creative Intelligence and because of the ritual
or prayer-like nature of TM's initiation ceremony, the puja.2 1 TM,
however, may be taught without reference to SCI, as the court itself
apparently recognized.? Moreover, the court's analogy between TM's
puja and the more traditional religious exercises that have been held
to be impermissible in the public schools is not entirely persuasive.
The cases cited to support this analogy involved programs consisting
of recognizably religious ceremonies that subtly compelled every stu-
dent to participate by requiring those students who objected to leave
length, see id. at 1315-20, concluding that "[w]hile the characterization of proponents
is properly admissible evidence, proponents cannot propagate concepts which society
recognizes as religious in nature merely because the proponents view the concepts as
secular." Id. at 1320.
21. See id. at 1326.
22. Id. at 1316 n.20.
23. See id. at 1326 n.29.
24. See id. at 1322-23.
25. See id. at 1324 n.26.
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the class.2" In the TM program, by contrast, only those students
electing to take the TM course were required to attend the puja.
Although the court emphasized the fact that each student so electing
was "compelled" to attend the "religious" puja, there was appar-
ently no compulsion to take the course in the first place, and, more-
over, the court did not explain how a student's attendance at a single
ceremony, conducted during nonschool hours, off school grounds, and
where the student was primarily an observer,2 contributed to an
establishment of religion. It is at least open to question, then,
whether the reasoning in Malnak compels the conclusion that any
state support of TM is unconstitutional. The analysis would be even
less compelling were TM organizations to dispense with the require-
ment that every initiate attend the puja.
This Note suggests one approach toward an establishment clause
analysis of SCI/TM as well as other activities and belief-systems that
are said to be nonreligious. The first section develops several objec-
tive criteria, based on the values underlying the establishment
clause, that help determine whether a given belief-system or practice
should be characterized as religious for purposes of the establishment
clause. Applying these criteria, the second section concludes that SCI
is a religion for establishment clause purposes and that TM is poten-
tially a religious practice. The third section of the Note reviews the
three tests-religious purpose, primary religious effect, and excessive
government entanglement with religion-that courts have used to
strike down state programs as establishments of religion and advo-
cates adoption of a fourth: a least religious means test, which would
forbid state use of religious means to achieve secular ends, both when
alternative secular means are reasonably available and when the su-
perior effectiveness of religious means is attributable to their religious
nature. The final section of the Note applies these tests to several
26. See, e.g., Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962) (involving a daily prayer pro-
gram); cf. School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963) (involving a daily Bible-
reading program). Although attendance may be voluntary in that students can absent
themselves, "non-conformity is not an outstanding characteristic of children." Illinois
ex reL McCollum v. Board of Educ., 333 U.S. 203, 227 (1948) (Frankfurter, J., separate
opinion). Furthermore, students are arguably subject to a subtle coercion:
[B]y requiring what is tantamount in the eyes of teachers and schoolmates
to a profession of disbelief, or at least of nonconformity, the [excusall proce-
dure may well deter those children who do not wish to participate ....
Such reluctance to seek exemption seems all the more likely in view of
the fact that children are disinclined at this age to step out of line or to flout
"peer-group norms."
School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 289-90 (1963) (Brennan, J., concurring).
27. 440 F. Supp. at 1305.
28. The court accepted as true the defendants' contention that the students took
no active part in the ceremony. See id. at 1308-09.
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possible programs of instruction in SCI/TM to determine the extent
to which such instruction is constitutionally permissible.29
I. A TEST FOR RELIGION UNDER THE
ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE
The first amendment permits no governmental action "respect-
ing an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise
thereof." Litigation arising under this language involves two concep-
tually distinct issues. The first is whether beliefs or activities inhib-
ited or encouraged by the government are religious in nature.3 The
29. The scope of this N4ote is limited to TM programs in primary and secondary
public schools. Its analysis, however, has implications for public funding of TM pro-
grams in other areas. At least seventeen TM research projects have received govern-
mental aid totaling more than $300,000. See The TM Craze: Forty Minutes to Bliss,
TmE, October 13, 1975, at 71, 74; Transcendental Meditation Barred from Public
Schools, supra note 3, at 247. TM has been used in government-sponsored rehabilita-
tion programs for crime, alcoholism, and drug dependency. See Cox, Transcendental
Meditation and the Criminal Justice System, 60 Ky. L.J. 411 (1972); LaMore, The
Secular Selling of Religion, 92 CHRISTIAN CENTURY 1133, 1134 (1975) (use of TM in
United States Army programs). Indications are that such use is likely to increase. See,
e.g., Berkeley Independent and Gazette, Nov. 8, 1976, at 8, col. 3 (Pennsylvania Coun-
cil on Drug and Alcohol Abuse considering use of TM); San Francisco Examiner, July
19, 1977, at 1 (California state parole board recommends $42,500 grant to teach TM
in prisons); Memorandum from Dan C. Doyle, Chief Counsel of California Dep't of the
Youth Authority, to Richard Isbell (Oct. 4, 1977) (on file at MINNESOTA LAW Rxmw)
(recommending that California Parole Services Branch proceed with TM program if
such a program seems useful). See generally Fulton, supra note 3.
While all public TM programs may pose constitutional problems, the problems
are particularly acute in the public precollege school. As Professor Choper has ob-
served, "children of elementary and high school age are far less mature and intellec-
tually developed than the public generally, . . . particularly unable to evaluate con-
flicting religious beliefs objectively, . . . especially susceptible to being influenced in
choice, and ...compelled by law to attend ...." Choper, Religion in the Public
Schools: A Proposed Constitutional Standard, 47 MINN. L. REv. 329, 337-38 (1963).
30, U.S. CONST. amend. I. Although the prohibition on governmental interfer-
ence with religion literally applies only to a "law" of "Congress," the Supreme Court
has held that the prohibition also applies, through the fourteenth amendment, to the
laws of the states and to the actions of their agencies. See, e.g., Engel v. Vitale, 370
U.S. 421 (1962)(establishment clause applies to actions of public school board); Ever-
son v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947) (establishment clause applies to state statute).
31. "Each value judgment under the Religion Clauses must therefore turn on
whether particular acts in question are intended to establish or interfere with religious
beliefs and practices or have the effect of doing so." Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S.
664, 669 (1970). See Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 214 (1972)(state may defeat
claim that a mandatory school attendance requirement "interferes with the practice
of a legitimate religious belief" if it appears "that the State does not deny the free
exercise of religious belief by its requirement").
This issue is itself really twofold: whether the government has actually interfered
[Vol. 62:887
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second is whether the government has unduly inhibited those beliefs
or activities (thereby violating the free exercise clause)3" or unduly
advanced them (thereby violating the establishment clause). It is the
second inquiry-the degree to which government may advance reli-
gion-that has dominated the establishment clause cases." This in-
quiry, both generally and with respect to SCI/TM, is the focus of
sections three and four of this Note; the present section is an attempt
to articulate a method of dealing with the threshold question: what
is religion for the purposes of the establishment clause?,
with or promoted a given belief or practice, and whether such belief or practice is
religious in nature. For purposes of the analysis in this section of the Note, the exist-
ence of some degree of interference or promotion will be presumed.
32. See Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 214 (1972)(state may defeat free exer-
cise claim even where burden on free exercise is shown if "there is a state interest of
sufficient magnitude to override the interest claiming protection under the Free Exer-
cise Clause").
33. See cases cited note 34 infra.
34. For the purposes of this inquiry, the establishment clause cases themselves
provide little concrete guidance. The unquestioned religious significance of the activi-
ties challenged in these cases has made an analysis of the meaning of religion for
establishment clause purposes unnecessary. For instance, the Court has not found it
necessary to articulate a test for religion in order to invalidate, as religious establish-
ments, programs that require notaries public to swear to a belief in "God," see Tor-
caso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488 (1961); allow public school children "released time" to
study Judaism and Christianity, see Illinois ex rel. McCollum v. Board of Educ., 333
U.S. 203 (1948); require recitation of prayers in the public schools, see Engel v. Vitale,
370 U.S. 421 (1962); require daily Bible reading in the public schools, see School Dist.
v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963); prohibit the teaching of evolutionary theory in the
public schools on the ground that it conflicts with creationist theory, see Epperson v.
Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97 (1968); and give tax monies to various types of Christian schools,
see, e.g., Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229 (1977); Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349
(1975); Sloan v. Lemon, 413 U.S. 825 (1973); Committee for Pub. Educ. v. Nyquist,
413 U.S. 756 (1973); Levitt v. Committee for Pub. Educ., 413 U.S. 472 (1973); Tilton
v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672 (1971); Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
Similarly, when upholding state activity against challenge, the Court has done so
on the ground that the activity did not constitute an establishment rather than that
the activity had no connection with religion. See, e.g., Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S.
229 (1977); Roemer v. Board of Pub. Works, 426 U.S. 736 (1976); Meek v. Pittenger,
421 U.S. 349 (1975); Hunt v. McNair, 413 U.S. 734 (1973); Tilton v. Richardson, 403
U.S. 672 (1971); Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664 (1970); Everson v. Board of Educ.,
330 U.S. 1 (1947).
Only in Schobl Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963), did the Court even ap-
proach the issue whether the challenged practice was religious, summarily dismissing
the school board's argument that its Bible-reading program was essentially secular
with the simple assertion that "the place of the Bible as an instrument of religion
cannot be gainsaid." Id. at 224.
The primary concern of the state and lower federal courts has similarly been
whether the state activity constitutes an establishment rather than whether the doc-
trine involved is religious. See, e.g., DeSpain v. DeKalb County Community School
Dist. 428, 384 F.2d 836 (7th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 906 (1968); State Bd. of
Educ. v. Board of Educ., 108 N.J. Super. 564, 262 A.2d 21 (Ch. Div.), aff'dper curiam,
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Like any other term in a constitution or statute, "religion" must
be construed in light of the provision in which it appears. 5 The task
of describing religion for purposes of the establishment clause, then,
is the task of identifying those beliefs or belief-systems that cannot
be promoted by the government without undermining the values that
the establishment clause is intende& to protect. The criteria of an
establishment clause religion should stem from and reflect those val-
ues; the criteria will be useful only to the extent that they distinguish
those systems that can be promoted by the government without en-
dangering establishment clause values from those that cannot.
Underlying the establishment clause are three basic values.
First, there is the value of protecting the integrity of pre-existing
religious belief from governmental interference." This value is central
to the free exercise clause, but it is also relevant to the establishment
clause. 7 Second, there is the complementary value of protecting the
57 N.J. 171, 270 A.2d 412 (1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 1013 (1971). A few cases,
however, have upheld state programs on the ground that the doctrine involved was not
religious. See Wright v. Houston Independent School Dist., 366 F. Supp. 1208 (S.D.
Tex. 1972) (biological evolution), aff'd per curiam, 486 F.2d 137 (5th Cir. 1973), cert.
denied, 417 U.S. 969 (1974); Cornwell v. State Bd. of Educ., 314 F. Supp. 340 (D. Md.
1969) (sex education), aff'd per curiam, 428 F.2d 471 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S.
942 (1970); Sheldon v. Fannin, 221 F. Supp. 766, 774 (D. Ariz.) (singing of national
anthem), appeal dismissed, 372 U.S. 228 (1963).
Until recently, even scholarly attempts to deal with the problem have been sparse
and tentative. A consideration of the meaning of religion under the establishment
clause has generally occurred when a commentator has argued for a broad definition
of religion under the free exercise clause in order to afford the fullest protection for
individual conscience and has then had to discuss whether such a broad definition
would not cripple the state in its effort to promote important societal values. Such a
consideration has nearly always resulted in a "two-definition" approach that defines
religion broadly for purposes of the free exercise clause and narrowly for purposes of
the establishment clause. See note 67 infra. Recently, fuller consideration of what
ought to be considered a religion for purposes of the establishment clause has been
offered. See Note, supra note 15.
35: The problems with a general definition, unguided by a specific purpose, are
obvious. One author has declared that "it is difficult if not impossible to arrive at an
adequate and acceptable definition of such a term as 'religion.' Every attempted defi-
nition carries with it the bias of the definer." L. PFEFFR, CHURCH, STATE, AND FREEDOM
607 (rev. ed. 1967). As if to prove the point, a psychologist, disclaiming any attempt
to provide an exhaustive list, once compiled 48 scholarly definitions of religion. See J.
LEUBA, A PSYCHOLOGICAL STUDY OF RELIGION 339-61 (1912).
36. See, e.g., School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 305 (1963) (Goldberg, J.,
concurring) ("The fullest realization of religious liberty requires that government nei-
ther engage in nor compel religious practices, that it effect no favoritism among sects
or between religion and nonreligion, and that it work deterrence of no religious be-
lief."); Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 431 (1962) ("When the power, prestige, and
financial support of government is placed behind a particular religious belief, the
indirect coercive pressure upon religious minorities to conform to the prevailing offi-
cially approved religion is plain.").
37. See Note, Toward a Uniform Valuation of the Religion Guarantees, 80 YALE
[Vol. 62:887
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integrity of individual religious choice from governmental influence.
This value is intimately related to the first, but it is distinct inas-
much as the first protects the integrity of religious choice already
made, whereas the second protects the freedom to adopt, modify, or
reject a particular belief. It will be argued that this latter value-
freedom of choice-is the central value underlying the establish-
ment clause,3" while the former-freedom of conscience-is the value
essential to free exercise. The third value underlying the establish-
ment clause is avoidance of religiously motivated political strife."
Whereas freedom of conscience and freedom of choice may be as-
cribed principally to one or the other clause, this third value underlies
both clauses equally. Whenever the government becomes involved
with a religious belief-system-whether by discouraging it and
thereby interfering with freedom of conscience or by encouraging it
and thereby interfering with freedom of choice-there inheres in that
involvement a danger of political strife along religious lines.
All three of these values have been commonly and properly iden-
tified as relevant to the establishment clause." Yet it is the conten-
L.J. 77, 87-89 (1970).
38. See Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 320 (1952) (Black, J., dissenting)
("State help to religion injects political and party prejudices into a holy field. It too
often substitutes force for prayer, hate for love, and persecution for persuasion. Govern-
ment should not be allowed, under cover of soft euphemism of 'cooperation,' to steal
into the sacred area of religious choice."); Schwarz, No Imposition of Religion: The
Establishment Clause Value, 77 YALE L.J. 692, 720 (1968)("Ihe ultimate fear is that
government aid will directly or indirectly be used to influence choice of religion ....
And it is this fear which causes strife and which makes use of the nonbeliever's or
other-believer's taxes so galling."); Note, supra note 37.
39. Apprehension of religious strife is cited routinely in the establishment clause
cases. See, e.g., Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 622 (1971)("Ordinary political
debate and division, however vigorous or even partisan, are normal and healthy mani-
festations of our democratic system of government, but political division along reli-
gious lines was one of the principal evils against which the First Amendment was
intended to protect."); Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 694 (1970)(Harlan, J.,
concurring) (objective of the establishment clause is "preventing that kind and degree
of government involvement in religious life that, as history teaches us, is apt to lead
to strife and frequently strain a political system to the breaking point"); Everson v.
Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 26-27 (1947)(Jackson, J., dissenting):
[The first amendment] was intended not only to keep the state's hands out
of religion, but to keep religion's hands off the state, and above all, to keep
bitter religious controversy out of public life by denying to every denomina-
tion any advantage from getting control of public policy or the public purse.
40. See, e.g., Freund, Public Aid to Parochial Schools, 82 HARv. L. REv. 1680,
1684 (1969) (policy grounds underlying establishment clause include government neu-
trality, voluntarism, and nonentanglement of church and state); Giannella, Religious
Liberty, Nonestablishment, and Doctrinal Development: Part ff. The Nonestablish-
ment Principle, 81 HAsv. L. Rzv. 513, 517-18 (1968) (scope of the establishment clause
is suggested by the twin values of "voluntarism" and "political noninvolvement").
An additional value thought to be served by the establishment clause was the
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tion of this Note that while forbidding the government from involving
itself with religious beliefs and belief-systems promotes all three of
these values, only freedom of choice is essential to the establishment
clause." Freedom of conscience and avoidance of religiously moti-
vated political strife are derivative. That is, governmental programs
promoting one belief are tolerable to the extent that they do not pose
an unacceptable danger of influencing initial religious choice, despite
the fact that such programs may indirectly threaten either to under-
mine pre-existing religious beliefs or to engender religious strife.'2
If, then, the primary goal of the establishment clause is to pro-
tect freedom of choice-to bar the government from doing that which
has the potential for inducing religious belief-the appropriate
method for determining whether a given belief-system is religious for
establishment clause purposes is to inquire whether governmental
promotion of that belief-system will create an unacceptable danger
of inducing religious belief. This formulation, of course, is not partic-
ilarly helpful as it stands, for it subsumes within it two unknowns:
what is religious belief, and what extrinsically observable factors
create an "unacceptable danger" that such belief will be induced.
prevention of interference by the national government with the choice of the states
with respect to establishing religion. Although it has been argued that the due process
clause of the fourteenth amendment was not meant to and should not incorporate the
establishment clause, see E. CORWIN, A CONSTrrUmON OF POWEaS IN A SECULAR STATE
111-16 (1951); Snee, Religious Disestablishment and the Fourteenth Amendment, 1954
WASH. U.L.Q. 371, the Supreme Court has rejected this contention, see note 30 supra,
without expressly considering it. For a brief discussion of the issue, see School Dist. v.
Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 256-58 (1963)(Brennan, J., concurring).
41. See Schwarz, supra note 38, at 710-15; cf. Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306,
313 (1952)("We sponsor an attitude on the part of government . . . that lets each
[religion] flourish according to the zeal of its adherents and the appeal of its
dogma."). See generally Note, supra note 37, at 92-101.
42. The primacy of free choice as an establishment clause value suggests that the
state may involve itself with religious beliefs, regardless of the religious reaction this
may trigger, as long as that involvement does not unduly influence free religious
choice. Thus, although protecting religious conscience and avoiding political strife
along religious lines are routinely cited as important establishment clause values, see
sources cited notes 36-37 & 39-40 supra, such values are relevant to the establishment
clause only when a state program is also capable of inducing religious belief. A govern-
mental program that actually undermines or runs contrary to the tenets of a particular
religion does not of itself create an establishment clause problem, see, e.g., Wright v.
Houston Independent School Dist., 366 F. Supp. 1208 (S.D. Tex. 1972) (instruction in
biological evolution not a religious establishment even though it was contrary to
certain religious beliefs), aff'd per curiam, 486 F.2d 137 (5th Cir. 1973), cert. denied,
417 U.S. 969 (1974); Cornwell v. State Bd. of Educ., 314 F. Supp. 340 (D. Md. 1969)
(sex education not an establishment of religion despite the fact that it was opposed
by various groups on religious grounds), aff'd per curiam, 428 F.2d 471 (4th Cir.), cert.
denied, 400 U.S. 942 (1970), although it may provide the basis for a free exercise claim,
see, e.g., West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943) (Jehovah's
Witness excused from flag salute program).
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Legal conceptions of religious belief have been developed by
courts in interpreting the free exercise clause and its statutory ana-
logs." As noted, the free exercise and establishment clauses differ in
their emphases-one forbids governmental inhibition of existing re-
ligious belief while the other forbids inculcation. Nevertheless, both
clauses obviously involve religious belief, and that concept is the
same regardless of whether the governmental action is alleged to im-
permissibly inhibit or encourage it.
In a number of free exercise cases, the belief-system at issue was
obviously and concededly a religion." In such cases courts have been
able to move directly to the question whether the burden imposed by
the government on the practice of that belief was permissible. In
other free exercise cases, however, litigants have claimed that a
state program or law interfered with practices that the individual
characterized as religious but that were identified with no conven-
tional religion. 5 In these cases, courts have had to confront the issue
whether the belief allegedly infringed was a religious belief.
Explicitly or implicitly, these courts have adopted the standard
that a belief or belief-system is religious if it plays a role in the lives
of its adherents analogous to the role played by conventional religions
in the lives of their adherents." Although essentially subjective, this
43. See, e.g., Universal Military and Service Act § 6(j), 50 U.S.C. app.
§ 456()(1970).
44. See, e.g., Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972) (Amish); Sherbert v. Ver-
ner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963)(Seventh-day Adventist); Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599
(1961)(Orthodox Jew).
45. See, e.g., Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 333 (1970)(plurality opinion);
United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163 (1965); Founding Church of Scientology v.
United States, 409 F.2d 1146 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 963 (1969); Remmers
v. Brewer, 361 F. Supp. 537 (S.D. Iowa 1973), affdper curiam, 494 F.2d 1277 (8th Cir.),
cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1012 (1974); People v. Woody, 61 Cal. 2d 716, 394 P.2d 813, 40
Cal. Rptr. 69 (1964).
46. Courts have adopted this or similar tests in a variety of contexts. See Found-
ing Church of Scientology v. United States, 409 F.2d 1146 (D.C. Cir.)(Scientologists'
claims with respect to "E-meter" held entitled to first amendment protection, and
truth-in-labeling requirements held not to apply; doctrine of Scientology likened to
that of traditional religions in that it gave a comprehensive explanation of man's
nature and his place in the universe), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 963 (1969); Remmers v.
Brewer, 361 F. Supp. 537 (S.D. Iowa 1973)(Church of New Song allowed to claim
protection of first amendment and thus to hold worship services in prison; doctrine of
Church likened to that of the Hindu faith), aff'd per curiam, 494 F.2d 1277 (8th Cir.),
cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1012 (1974); Fulwood v. Clemmer, 206 F. Supp. 370, 373 (D.D.C.
1962)(Muslims entitled to first amendment privileges in prison because their faith, in
its nature and effect on individuals, was comparable to that of recognized religious
faiths); People v. Woody, 61 Cal. 2d 716, 394 P.2d 813, 40 Cal. Rptr. 69 (1964)(Indian
users of peyote exempt from regulation banning such use because of their belief that
such use brought them into contact with God); cf. Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S.
333 (1970)(plurality opinion) (individual entitled to statutory draft exemption granted
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inquiry has an objective component as well, for the courts look at the
belief-system itself to judge whether it can reasonably be thought
capable of playing a religious role in the life of the individual adher-
ent.4
7
The factor that governs this inquiry is an element of comprehen-
siveness. Speaking generally, the function of a religion is to provide
the adherent with answers to the fundamental questions of life: the
to religious objectors if the belief asserted to be religious imposed a duty of conscience,
regardless of whether belief was characterized as religious by the individual); United
States v. Seeger, 383 U.S. 163 (1965)(individual entitled to statutory draft exemption
granted to religious objectors if his objection was based on belief that was meaningful
and occupied role in his life analogous to belief in God in life of orthodox believer).
But cf. Missouri Church of Scientology v. State Tax Comm'n, 560 S.W.2d 837, 842
(Mo. 1977)(Church of Scientology disqualified for property tax exemption because of
lack of "belief in the Supreme Being"), appeal dismissed, 47 U.S.L.W. 3191 (U.S. Oct.
3, 1978). See also Washington Ethical Soc'y v. District of Columbia, 249 F.2d 127
(D.C. Cir. 1957) (group entitled to property tax exemption accorded those using build-
ings for religious purposes; group espoused a code of moral precepts and held weekly
Sunday services similar to those of formal religions; at least some members of the group
attached religious significance to their beliefs); Fellowship of Humanity v. County of
Alameda, 153 Cal. App. 2d 673, 692, 315 P.2d 394, 406 (1957) (humanist group entitled
to religious property tax exemption; test for religious belief is whether the belief occu-
pies the same place in the life of its holders as does an orthodox belief in the lives of
its holders, and whether group conducts itself in the way that an orthodox religious
group conducts itself).
47. For examples of determinations that a particular belief-system can sustain
religious belief, see Founding Church of Scientology v. United States, 409 F.2d 1146,
1160 (D.C. Cir.)(faith in Scientology, which provides a "general account of man and
his nature comparable in scope, if not content, to those of some recognized religions,"
was religion for purposes of free exercise clause), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 963 (1969);
Remmers v. Brewer, 361 F. Supp. 537 (S.D. Iowa 1973) (faith in "Eclat," the inanimate
and supreme force or spirit pervading all things, was religion for purposes of free
exercise clause), aff'd per curiam, 494 F.2d 1277 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1012
(1974); Fulwood v. Clemmer, 206 F. Supp. 370, 373 (D.D.C. 1962)(Muslim faith is
religion as it "calls for a belief in the existence of a supreme being controlling the
destiny of man"); People v. Woody, 61 Cal. 2d 716,394 P.2d 813,40 Cal. Rptr. 69 (1964)
(belief that users of peyote enter into direct contact with God religious for purposes of
free exercise clause).
For examples of determinations that some belief-systems cannot reasonably sus-
tain religious belief, see Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 216 (1972) (dictum) (beliefs
philosophical and personal, rather than religious, do not qualify as religions under
religion clauses); Theriault v. Carlson, 495 F.2d 390, 395 (5th Cir.)(prisoners' faith in
"Eclat" not a religion but obviously a sham and an absurdity), cert. denied, 419 U.S.
1003 (1974); United States v. Kuch, 288 F. Supp. 439 (D.D.C. 1968)(Neo-American
Church, whose symbol was a three-eyed toad, whose "key" was a bottle opener, whose
sacramental foods were LSD and marijuana, whose official song was Puff, The Magic
Dragon, and whose motto was "Victory over Horseshit!" found not to represent a
religion within meaning of first amendment, where a member raised a free exercise
claim in defense to a prosecution for possession of marijuana); In re McMillan, 30 N.C.
App. 235, 238, 226 S.E.2d 693, 695 (1976)("deep rooted conviction for Indian heritage"
not religious for constitutional purposes).
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nature of existence and the role of the individual within that exist-
ence." If a belief-system is to play in the life of an individual a role
analogous to that played by conventional faiths, it must at least
approximate the comprehensiveness of conventional religions in the
number of relationships to which it is relevant and in the number of
things it explains or the number of questions it answers." This cosmo-
logical aspect of religion has at least three consequences that together
distinguish religious from nonreligious belief. First, because religious
belief is comprehensive, it has the potential to permeate everything
the believer does." Second, because its explanations can neither be
empirically verified" or made understandable in solely rational
terms,5" religious belief must rest on faith. Third, religious belief
48. See D. VANCE, THE SuPRm m CouRT AND vi DEFINITION OF REWGION 86 (1970);
Mansfield, Conscientious Objection-1964 Term, 1965 REUGION & PUB. ORDER 3, 10.
It is almost certainly true that the Founding Fathers and, originally, the Supreme
Court conceived of religion almost exclusively in terms of traditional religious con-
cepts. See, e.g., United States v. Macintosh, 283 U.S. 605, 633-34 (1931)(Hughes, C.J.,
dissenting)("The essence of religion is belief in a relation to God involving duties
superior to those arising from any human relation."); Davis v. Beason, 133 U.S. 333,
342 (1890)(" '[Rieligion' . . . has reference to one's views of his relations to his
Creator, and to the obligations they impose of reverence for his being and character,
and of obedience to his will."); J. MADISON, A Memorial and Remonstrance, in 1
Lnrrms AND OTMx WmrrMGs oF JAMES MADISON 162 (Philadelphia 1865)(Religion is
"the duty which we owe to our Creator, and the manner of discharging it.").
Recent cases have expanded that conception. See, e.g., Torcaso v. Watkins, 367
U.S. 488, 495 n.11 (1961); Founding Church of Scientology v. United States, 409 F.2d
1146 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 963 (1969). But see Missouri Church of Scien-
tology v. State Tax Comm'n, 560 S.W.2d 837, 842 (Mo. 1977)("[W]e conclude that
the constitutional and statutory term religious worship [for the purposes of property
taxation] embody [sic] as a minimum requirement a belief in the Supreme Being."),
appeal dismissed, 47 U.S.L.W. 3191 (U.S. Oct. 3, 1978). Nevertheless, the notion of
religion still remains firmly rooted in analogy to the world's major faiths. See, e.g.,
United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163 (1965).
49. See Founding Church of Scientology v. United States, 409 F.2d 1146, 1160
(D.C. Cir.)(faith in Scientology held to be religious because it provided a "general
account of man and his nature comparable in scope, if not content, to those of some
recognized religions"), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 963 (1969).
50. "By its nature, religion-in the comprehensive sense in which the Constitu-
tion uses that word-is an aspect of human thought and action which profoundly
relates the life of man to the world in which he lives. Religious beliefs pervade...
virtually all human activity." McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 461 (1961)(Frank-
furter, J., separate opinion).
51. See Le Clercq, The Monkey Laws and the Public Schools: A Second
Consumption?, 27 VAND. L. REv. 209, 228 (1974)("Special creation is a supernatural
doctrine that presupposes a creator the existence of which is empirically unverifiable.
Because acceptance of the doctrine . . . must be a matter of faith, it is a religious
doctrine . . . .")(footnotes omitted) (emphasis in original).
52. The very absurdity and impossibility of the [religious] statements
. . . [are] the real ground for belief. . . . An improbable opinion has to
submit sooner or later to correction. But the statements of religion are the
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holds implications for society beyond the individual because a uni-
versal view must necessarily be held to be universally true."
The comprehensive nature of religious belief helps to distinguish
it from other kinds of belief and explain why it is given special consti-
tutional status. First, because religious belief provides a comprehen-
sive and potentially pervasive explanation of existence, its adoption
or rejection by an individual is perhaps the most personal and signifi-
cant decision he can make. Thus, choices with respect to religious
belief are uniquely sensitive to governmental interference. Second,
because religious belief is based to a large degree upon suprarational
perceptions, while having strong societal implications, issues that
revolve around religious belief rarely will be subject to rational politi-
cal compromise.
These factors-the significance of the belief for the individual,
its fundamentally suprarational character, and its implications for
society-together create a tendency to promote, defend, and attack
such belief with a peculiar vehemence. The uniquely bitter and ulti-
mately irresolvable controversies that have surrounded religious is-
sues explain why "[t]he Establishment Clause withdrew from the
sphere of legitimate legislative concern and competence a specific,
but comprehensive, area of human conduct: man's belief or disbelief
in the verity of some transcendental idea and man's expression in
action of that belief or disbelief."'"
This analysis helps explain the decisions of courts rejecting es-
tablishment clause challenges on the basis that no religious element
was present. Public school programs that have survived such chal-
lenges have involved sex education," instruction in the theory of evo-
most improbable of all and yet they persist for thousands of years. Their
wholly unexpected vitality proves the existence of a sufficient cause which
has so far eluded scientific investigation.
C. JUNG, Transformation Symbolism in the Mass, in 11 THE CoLLECa WORKS OF C.G.
JuNG 201, 251 (1958); see United States v. Kauten, 133 F.2d 703, 708 (2d Cir. 1943)
(statutory draft exemption):
Religious belief arises from a sense of the inadequacy of reason as a means
of relating the individual to his fellow-men and to his universe-a sense
common to men in the most primitive and in the most highly civilized
societies. It accepts the aid of logic but refuses to be limited by it.
53. "A cosmic philosophy is not constructed to fit a man; a cosmic philosophy is
constructed to fit a cosmos. A man can no more possess a private religion than he can
possess a private sun and moon." G. K. CHETERTON, The Book of Job, in G.K.C. AS
M.C. 42 (J. de Fonseka ed. 1929).
54. McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 465-66 (1961)(Frankfurter, J., separate
opinion).
55. See Cornwell v. State Bd. of Educ., 314 F. Supp. 340 (D. Md. 1969) (uphold-
ing program), aff'd per curiam, 428 F.2d 471 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 942
(1970); Medeiros v. Kiyosaki, 52 Haw. 436, 478 P.2d 314 (1970)(upholding program).
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lution,5' and patriotic songs and ceremonies." While all of these pro-
grams offend certain religious beliefs, none necessarily implicates a
world view that is itself comprehensive enough to sustain or preclude
religious belief. A sex education program is probably the easiest ex-
ample of the three because the subject matter can be taught as a
matter of verifiable fact, thus avoiding implication of any world
view." Evolution has a more comprehensive subject matter than sex
education, relies more heavily on inferences that cannot be proven
scientifically, and is probably more inconsistent with the major te-
nets of widely held religious beliefs." Nevertheless, evolution does
not necessarily implicate a particular world view. Thus, while promo-
tion of evolution as an aid to the teaching of biology may endanger
the free exercise rights of members of a creationist religion,"0 it does
not create a reasonable potential of inducing religious belief. Patriotic
promotions may come closer to presenting an issue of religious estab-
lishment, for patriotic feeling can be highly important to the individ-
ual, is suprarational in character, and clearly holds implications for
society as a whole." It is, therefore, comprehensive in the three senses
mentioned above."2 Nevertheless, patriotism is, by definition, limited
in its scope. 3 It is at most only a partial explanation of the universe
56. See Wright v. Houston Independent School Dist., 366 F. Supp. 1208 (S.D.
Tex. 1972)(upholding public school instruction in evolution in biology class), aff'd per
curiam, 486 F.2d 137 (5th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 969 (1974).
57. See Sheldon v. Fannin, 221 F. Supp. 766, 774 (D. Ariz.)(upholding singing
of national anthem), appeal dismissed, 372 U.S. 228 (1963). The establishment claim
in Fannin was not that the state was promoting patriotism as a religion but that the
state was promoting religion with a patriotic song that referred to "God." No case has
involved the claim that promotion of patriotism as such is an establishment. Neverthe-
less, some religious groups have deemed certain patriotic ceremonies to be a form of
idol worship. See West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
58. See Recent Developments, The Constitutionality Under the Religion Clauses
of the First Amendment of Compulsory Sex Education in Public Schools, 68 Micm. L.
Rav. 1050, 1060 (1970)("Unless sex education courses affirmatively espouse the view
that God is irrelevant to matters of sex ... they should not be vulnerable to the
argument that they constitute an establishment of religion, even of a secular reli-
gion.") (emphasis added). See generally Note, Sex Education, The Constitutional Lim-
its of State Compulsion, 43 S. CAL. L. Rav. 548 (1970).
59. See Note, Freedom of Religion and Science Instruction in Public Schools, 87
YALE L.J. 515, 517 n.14, 556 n.206, 558 n.211 (1978)(suggesting compatibility of the
general theory of evolution with the religious belief of a Darwinistic humanist).
60. See id. at 518-43.
61. See also United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163, 169, 187-88 (1965)(belief
derived from "reading and meditation 'in our democratic American culture, with its
values derived from the western religious and philosophical tradition,' " considered
religious belief for draft exemption purposes).
62. See text accompanying notes 50-53 supra.
63. See West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 641
(1943)("Tnere is no mysticism in the American concept of the State or of the nature
or origin of its authority.").
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and the individual's role within it.
This requirement of comprehensiveness provides the first ele-
ment of religious belief: its subject matter. But the fact that the
belief-system is comprehensive to a degree that approximates that of
conventional religions is not enough under either the free exercise or
the establishment clause, for there are innumerable philosophies that
may be regarded as comprehensive but that, in the abstract, would
not be classified as religious. Nor do courts dealing with free exercise
challenges to state programs stop with this abstract appraisal: once
it is decided that the system could play a role analogous to conven-
tional religion, the question remains whether it actually does." And,
under the free exercise clause, answering this question involves an
examination of whether the belief is held with the sincerity and in-
tensity that, at least theoretically, accompany adherence to the more
conventional faiths."5
Patriotism could, of course, be elaborated into a comprehensive belief-system,
Hitler's National Socialism being a possible example. See generally H. BAYNEs, GER-
MANY PossEssED (1941); E. JACKH, THE WAR FOR MAN's SouL (1943). But patriotism
itself is love of country and nothing more. See R. COLUNGWOOD, FArrH AND REAsON 140-
41 (L. Rubinoff ed. 1968):
Faith is the religious habit of mind .... [It is the attitude which we
take up toward things as a whole. There is a certain analogy to it in the
attitude which we take up toward a relative or limited whole like our coun-
try .... [Blut in so far as it is not the whole but only a whole, that is, at
bottom only a finite thing, it is at best only an earthly god and our worship
of it is not pure worship but in part idolatrous.
64. Courts have addressed the issue whether a belief is sincerely held by asking
whether a belief-system comprehensive by its terms is adhered to in practice, see, e.g.,
Theriault v. Silber, 391 F. Supp. 578, 582 (W.D. Tex. 1975) (Eclatarian faith not reli-
gious as the church was a "masquerade" that encouraged "do-as-you-please philoso-
phy"), vacated and remanded per curiam, 547 F.2d 1279 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 434
U.S. 943 (1977); Banks v. Havener, 234 F. Supp. 27, 29 (E.D. Va. 1964)(Black Muslim
movement a religion as "[c]onsiderable evidence was adduced explaining the dogma
of the Muslims and its purported effect on its adherents")(emphasis added), and by
asking whether a belief-system not necessarly comprehensive by its terms is neverthe-
less held to with religious devotion, cf., e.g., Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 333,
340 (19-0) (plurality opinion) (believer's sincere belief, even if "purely ethical or moral
in source," is religious if it functions "as a religion in his life" by imposing a "duty of
conscience"); United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163, 166, 185 (1965)(beliefs in and
"devotion to goodness and virtue for their own sakes" characterized as religious, since
beliefs were sincerely and deeply held and were, in believer's "own scheme of things,
religious")(emphasis in original). Both Welsh and Seeger construed language in the
draft exemption provisions of the Selective Service laws, which required a "belief in a
relation to a Supreme Being." That language was deleted by the Military Selective
Service Act of 1967, Pub. L. No. 90-40, § 7, 81 Stat. 100.
65. In theory, at least, the inquiries into the subject matter of the belief, see D.
VANCE, supra note 48; note 47 supra, and into the importance it holds in the life of the
individual, see note 64 supra, are separable. For instance, one may nominally adhere
to a traditional religious faith without taking the faith to heart. The faith of such an
individual may be merely philosophical and not a matter of deep conviction. On the
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Thus, a belief both comprehensive and sincere may qualify as
religious under the free exercise clause.66 A court will consider the
offended belief or belief-system in the abstract to determine whether
other hand, one may hold with conviction and zeal to certain beliefs or prejudices that
do not truly implicate the comprehensive concerns of religion.
In practice, however, the two inquiries overlap. That the subject matter of the
belief involved is clearly religious will reinforce the believer's claim that, for him, the
belief is sincere and devout. Conversely, that the belief involved is held with deep
conviction reinforces the believer's claim that the subject matter of the belief is reli-
gious in that, for him, it implicates matters of ultimate concern. See Clark, Guidelines
for the Free Exercise Clause, 83 HAv. L. Rsv. 327, 339-40 (1969)("Any man who
attempts to justify his action as right must relate it at some point in his thinking to
some basic postulate concerning human life.").
Commentators have disputed whether a content-centered, theological view of reli-
gion or a more personal, psychological view is the more appropriate for free exercise
purposes. Compare id. at 339-44 (advocating case-by-case inquiry into bona fides of
individual belief, which need not be religious in any traditional sense), with Dodge,
supra note 15, at 691-96, 712-15 (setting forth objective criteria of religion and criticiz-
ing any approach that focuses too exclusively on the individual), and Mansfield, supra
note 48, at 10 (character and subject matter of truths asserted, rather than their
subjective importance to the individual, are primary reasons for calling beliefs in those
truths religious).
Dictum in Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972), indicates that the content-
centered view will prevail. In Yoder, Chief Justice Burger contrasted the "religious"
beliefs of the Amish, based on the Bible, with the "philosophical" beliefs of a person
such as Henry David Thoreau:
[flf the Amish asserted their claims because of their subjective evaluation
and rejection of the contemporary secular values accepted by the majority,
much as Thoreau rejected the social values of his time and isolated himself
at Walden Pond, their claims would not rest on a religious basis. Thoreau's
choice was philosophical and personal rather than religious, and such belief
does not rise to the demands of the Religion Clauses.
Id. at 216. For a criticism of this implicit rejection of the broad definition of religion
endorsed in United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163 (1965), see Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406
U.S. 205, 247-49 (Douglas, J., dissenting in part).
66. See D. VANCE, supra note 48, at 86 (discussing the Supreme Court's broad
construction of religious belief for draft exemption purposes in United States v. Seeger,
380 U.S. 163 (1965)):
[Tihe resulting definition of religion rests upon two fundamental and re-
lated ideas. First, "religion" as a body of ideas is separable from other sets
of ideas by the nature of the concerns of religious thought. Religious beliefs
are primarily directed to providing a sense of order and comprehension when
man faces such complex questions as the nature of man, the purpose of life,
and the vastness of the universe. Religion represents a concern, then, for
questions and problems transcending the concerns of political and social
ideologies.
The second principle or proposition evident in the new definition of
religion concerns the impact of ideas upon the individual. The individual's
response to these ultimate questions and concerns which are the province of
religion will have an impact on the way he behaves and will provide him, on
occasion, with a rationale for his behavior.
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it is sufficiently comprehensive to be religious and then will deter-
mine whether the complainant truly holds to the offended belief.
The establishment clause, however, with its differing purpose,
requires a different method. The concept of religious belief remains
the same, but the method of determining whether religious belief is
involved in a particular case must differ. As noted previously, the free
exercise clause is primarily concerned with actual inhibitions of reli-
gious belief. As a result, courts need not consider potential inhibi-
tions, for in a free exercise case there will be a litigant before the court
claiming an actual and concrete infringement of his religious beliefs.
The establishment clause, by contrast, is concerned with induction
of religious belief. But rarely, if ever, will there be a person before the
court claiming that a governmental program has instilled in him a
religious belief in the system promoted. Moreover, even if there were,
that would not be determinative, for the court must consider as well
the interests of all those who are not present but who are nevertheless
affected by the governmental program. As a consequence, the second
stage of the inquiry-that into sincerity-must be done in the ab-
stract. Whereas the free exercise inquiry is in part objective and in
part subjective, the establishment inquiry must, in both aspects, be
objective. Thus, while the inquiry into whether the belief-system in
question can reasonably be said to be capable of playing a role analo-
gous to that played by conventional religions is common to both the
free exercise and establishment clauses, the inquiry into whether that
is in fact the case gives way in an establishment clause challenge to
an inquiry into the likelihood that, given govenmental support of this
belief-system, someone will adopt it as a religion."7
67. Thus, given that a belief-system is capable of sustaining religious belief, it
is religious for free exercise purposes if it is devoutly held by the individual claiming
protection and is religious for establishment purposes if the individual claiming a
violation can show a reasonable likelihood that state promotion of the belief-system
will lead others to hold to it devoutly.
This distinction is roughly equivalent to that drawn by Professor Tribe, who calls
that which is "arguably religious" a religion under the free exercise clause and that
which is "arguably nonreligious" a nonreligion under the establishment clause. See L.
TRUBE, supra note 15, at 827-28. Tribe's "arguably religious" versus "arguably nonreli-
gious" is a useful sfiorthand but too vague a description by which to distinguish the
free exercise and establishment clause concepts of religion. The distinction this Note
provides is more precise. Recognition of the distinction between a belief-system merely
capable of being religious and one likely to be so resolves the apparent contradiction
between the contention of Justice Rutledge that religion must mean the same thing
under both the establishment clause and the free exercise clause, see Everson v. Board
of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 32-33 (1947) (dissenting opinion) ("[T]he word governs two
prohibitions and governs them alike."), and the "two-definition" approach suggested
by several constitutional scholars, see, e.g., P. KAUPER, RELGION AN THE CONSTrruTrON
31-32 (1964); Freund, supra note 40, at 1686 n.14 ("It may be suggested that a conven-
tional definition of religion or religious practice is controlling in applying the non-
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In answering this question, four factors should be taken into
account: the degree to which the belief-system is comprehensive,
whether it lays a claim to ultimate truth, whether it is supported by
symbolic trappings, and whether it is promoted or espoused by an
organized group. These factors are important for two reasons. First,
each induces and fosters belief in the subject matter with which it is
associated. Second, each factor is evidence of the extraordinary sig-
nificance attached to the subject matter by the belief-system's adher-
ents. When considered together, the four factors can guide a court in
determining whether state involvement with a particular belief-
system implicates the establishment clause.
Ralph Waldo Emerson once wrote that the test of a religion or
philosophy is the number of things it explains." The more questions
that a belief-system answers, the more likely it is to be accepted by
establishment clause, while a heterodox version is entitled to protection under the free-
exercise clause, which safeguards the nonconformist conscience."); Galanter, Religious
Freedoms in the United States: A Turning Point?, 1966 Wis. L. REv. 217, 266-67 (In a
free exercise case the "claimants' view of religion controls the characterization of their
objection as a religious one" while in an establishment clause case the challenged
governmental action "must be essentially religious in some widely shared public
understanding."); Van Alstyne, Constitutional Separation of Church and State: The
Quest for a Coherent Position, 57 AM. POL. Sci. REv. 865, 874 (1963) (footnotes omitted)
(emphasis in original):
[Wihen the issue is whether freedom to exercise religion has been abridged
rather than whether religion has been established ... the ... suggestion
that "religion" is not merely co-extensive with the better established and
more highly organized sects, may be taken more seriously. For while the
primary (although not exclusive) concern of the Establishment Clause is to
resist the importunities of distinctly institutional religious pressures, the
concern of the abridgment clause is to protect individual prerogatives of
conscience, and not merely to protect the freedom of institutionalized reli-
gion or conscience.
Under the test considered here, religion will always refer to a supremely important
and comprehensive belief, regardless of the religion clause involved, but the determina-
tion whether a state program implicates that belief will differ between the clauses.
Because the free exercise clause aims chiefly to prevent "the severe psychic turmoil
that can be brought about by compelled violations of conscience," Clark, supra note
65, at 336-38, a free exercise claim makes appropriate an inquiry that gauges the
impact of governmental action upon particular individuals and thus delves into the
sincerity of individual belief. Because the establishment clause aims at preventing
potential induction of religious belief by proscribing laws "respecting an establish-
ment," an establishment claim makes appropriate an inquiry that gauges the potential
impact of governmental action on the public generally and thus mandates a conside-
ration of objective factors that make it likely that a religious belief will be induced.
Thus, while the meaning of religious belief remains constant under the religion clauses,
a "two-definition" approach that reflects the differing goals of the religion clauses is
appropriate to determine whether such belief is implicated by a particular state pro-
gram.
68. R.W. EMERSON, JOURNALS (1836), quoted in INTERNATIONAL THESAURUS OF
QUOTATONS (paperback ed. 1970).
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an individual as his explanation of life. The more comprehensive a
state-promoted belief-system is, then, the more likely it is that the
state is influencing religious choice by apparently recommending to
the individual a faith that will color the way in which he perceives
reality. Thus, while the degree of the comprehensiveness of a belief-
system is not the only test of religion, it is one of several differentia.
Another factor that will tend to encourage religious belief is the
belief-system's claim to ultimate truth. The proximate source of such
a claim is typically a special revelation, as recorded in history or
myth, or the mystical experience of the individual who subscribes to
the belief. 9 The ultimate source is believed to be the force that orders
the universe. If a belief promoted by the state is one whose validity
or appeal rests in part on its transcendental reality or its divine
origin, the likelihood that affected individuals will take the belief to
heart is increased, for the source and subject matter of such belief is,
by definition, beyond critical examination. It is an ideal that must
be accepted or rejected on faith alone.70
The maintenance or strengthening of religious belief often de-
pends on symbols, practices, rituals, myths, and celebrations. These
trappings of religion serve to reify the abstract principles of a shared
belief-system and give it an active and participatory character.7 1
69. "All schools of religious thought make enormous assumptions, generally on
the basis of revelations authenticated by some sign or miracle. The appeal in such
matters is to a very different plane of credulity than is invoked by representations of
secular fact in commerce." United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78, 94 (1944)(Jackson,
J., dissenting).
70. Even if a belief or belief-system does not contain its own claim to ultimate
truth, it may become religious, for establishment clause purposes, if the state promotes
it in a manner that suggests it is ultimate truth. Thus, the state may not teach morality
as divine law, see Malnak v. Mahesh, 440 F. Supp. 1284, 1317 n.20 (D.N.J. 1977),
appeal docketed, Nos. 78-1568, 78-1569 (3d Cir. May 11, 1978), or affirm that any
particular value-system is right and that its rivals are wrong. Cf. Sympos-
ium-Constitutional Problems in Church-State Relations, 61 Nw. U.L. Rav. 759, 811
(1966) (emphasis added):
[A] possible test for determining whether a particular school practice con-
flicts with the establishment clause would be: whether a given practice takes
the form of an intellectual exercise concerning questions of ultimate moral
values, a general search for ultimate truth, or whether it partakes of a certain
mystical dogmatism resembling a ceremony or ritual. This interpretation
does not lend itself to "wall of separation" imagery, for it assumes-rightly
or not depending on the particular case-the simultaneous existence of a
secular (educational) practice and a religious (existential-humanistic) one.
The danger of inculcating religious belief through such dogmatic affirmations is partic-
ularly great when precollege school children are involved. See Tilton v. Richardson,
403 U.S. 672, 685-86 (1971).
71. Common examples of religious trappings are distinct moral codes, see, e.g.,
Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972); belief in such supernatural phenomena as
miracles, see, e.g., United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78 (1944) (group whose leaders
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They thereby confirm and strengthen acceptance of the eternal and
inexplicable truths that they symbolize.12 When the state allies itself
with groups that rely on such trappings, or when the state identifies
itself with the trappings themselves,7 3 the state lends to these trap-
pings its own symbolic authority.74 When, on the other hand, the state
promotes a belief-system that lacks dogma, ceremony, and symbol-
ism and that appeals solely to intellect or even to intuition, its promo-
tion is far less effective. The belief-system is left in the realm of
speculative philosophizing and is therefore less likely to achieve a
concrete significance in the life of the individual.
Religious belief, while ultimately the concern of the individual,
is almost necessarily the business of a group. 5 Coreligionists are likely
claimed to have met Jesus Christ assumed to be religious); use of symbol, see, e.g.,
Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 615 (1971) (crosses, crucifixes, paintings, and
statues identifying building as religious); Allen v. Morton, 495 F.2d 65, 69 (D.C. Cir.
1973) (Tamm, J., concurring) (display of Christmas crdche); use of ritual, see, e.g.,
State ex reL. Swann v. Pack, 527 S.W.2d 99 (Tenn. 1975) (snake handling as religious
practice), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 954 (1976); devotional reading of holy writings, see,
e.g., School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963); recitations of prayers or creeds,
see, e.g., Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962); wearing sacramental attire, see, e.g.,
Zellers v. Huff, 55 N.M. 501, 517, 236 P.2d 949, 964 (1951) ('"The wearing of religious
garb and insignia [has] a propagandizing effect for the church, [and] by its very
nature [introduces] sectarian religion into the school."); and the performance by
clergy of certain formal ceremonies, such as marriages and funerals, see, e.g., Founding
Church of Scientology v. United States, 409 F.2d 1146 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 396
U.S. 963 (1969).
72. See generally E. UNDaRmL, WoRsm 20-41 (1937). "[A] sensible sign has
been accepted as the representative of a supra-sensible Reality, in order that it may
bridge the gap between the sensible and spiritual worlds. . . ." Id. at 29. "A symbol
is a significant image, which helps the worshipping soul to apprehend spiritual real-
ity." Id. at 42.
73. See, e.g., School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963); Engel v. Vitale, 370
U.S. 421 (1962).
74. See also School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 262-63 (1963) (Brennan, J.,
concurring) (The fatal flaw of the "released-time" program in Illinois ex rel. McCollum
v. Board of Educ., 333 U.S. 203 (1948), was that religious teachers were permitted to
use public classrooms and were thus invested with "all the symbols of authority" at
the command of the regular school teacher.).
75. "The really religious beliefs are always common to a determined group,
which makes profession of adhering to them and to practising the rites connected with
them .... In all history, we do not find a single religion without a Church." E.
DuRiKHnm, THa ELE~mmrrmY FowMs oF THE RELIGIous LFE 43-44 (1915); see id. at 423-
25. See generally K. DUNLAP, RELGION: ITS FUNcnONS iN HUMAN LaE 255-70 (1946). The
relationship between symbolic trappings and group activity is apparent: "The most
characteristic means of human worship are precisely those which the solitary does not
require ... the agreed symbols, and the established formulas and rites, which make
concerted religious action and even concerted religious emotion possible, and so create
the worshipping group." E. UNDmmL, supra note 72, at 22.
For purposes of the Establishment Clause, religion has pretty well been
confined to the preachments of organized groups-which groups may at-
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to organize, both to support each other in the discovery and applica-
tion of the truths of their religion and to promote their beliefs in the
outside world. Moreover, the more sophisticated the religion grows,
the more necessary it becomes for the group to congregate around
leaders who can codify and interpret its tenets, guide the adherents
in the proper application of these tenets, and help maintain the tradi-
tion and discipline that will preserve the religion's integrity and ap-
peal. That a state-sponsored belief-system is identified with an or-
ganized group increases the likelihood that state promotion will lead
to strong personal adherence, since organization not only makes it
possible for a group to manipulate the political process in the first
place'1 but also allows the group to build upon state promotion of
its particular dogma by continuing to influence individuals after they
have gone beyond the reach of the state program.
The four factors might best be reviewed in the context of assert-
edly nonreligious programs that nevertheless have possible religious
implications. Consider, for instance, the possible establishment
clause implications of a public school course in Darwin's theory of
biological development. While this theory influences scientific meth-
odology and the interpretation of empirical observations, it does not
purport to explain or prescribe the individual's role in the universe.
In short, Darwinism as biological theory is not sufficiently compre-
hensive to sustain a religious belief.71 In addition, it does not appear
tempt to manipulate the civil process to establish their own distinct theology
through the law or attempt to wrest benefits from the civil process which are
of special concern to them and not shared by a cross-section of persons
outside their particular church or band of churches. The laws requiring the
saying of prayers or the reading of scriptures in class, for instance, are clear
example of distinct efforts at institutional religious aggrandizement, not
primarily serving any needs or wants of others.
Van Alstyne, supra note 67, at 873-74; see Dodge, supra note 15, at 712-15. Dodge
regards group affiliation as essential to a claim arising under the free exercise clause.
This Note regards such affiliation as being more important in an establishment case
than in a free exercise case, but truly essential to neither. What is important in either
case is whether religious belief is burdened or established; that the belief in question
is held by a cohesive group may contribute to the finding of a religious clause violation
but it is hardly conclusive.
76. It is an unfortunate fact of history that when some of the very groups
which had most strenously opposed the established Church of England found
themselves sufficiently in control of colonial governments in this
country to write their own prayers into law, they piassed laws making their
own religion the official religion of their respective colonies.
Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 427 (1962).
77. This is not, of course, to say that a belief-system comprehensive enough to
be deemed capable of supporting religious belief could not be built on a foundation of
Darwinism. See, e.g., J. HuxLEY, RELIGION wiTHouTr REvELATON 213-14, 217, 218, 219-
20 (1957):
[E]volutionary biology has given us a new view, impossible of attainment
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that Darwinism is promoted through claims of mystical revelation,
the use of symbolism, or the activities of a missionary-minded group.
Public promotion of a philosophy such as Marxism presents a
closer question. The theories of Karl Marx, which deal with social,
economic, and historical development, provide a more complete ex-
planation of the world, and the appropriate roles of individuals, or
classes, within it, than do the theories of Charles Darwin, which deal
with the history of biological development. Moreover, Marxism has
attracted millions of adherents and has been called the state religion
of some communist countries; ' Marxism's dogmas have been likened
to those of traditional religious faiths." Nevertheless, several charac-
teristics of Marxism and the social setting in which the state might
promote it make its characterization as an establishment clause reli-
gion unlikely. First, Marxism lacks the degree of comprehensiveness
observed in many religions. It concerns itself only with this world and
not with transcendental realities, which it rejects as irrelevant. For
the same reason, Marxism lays no clear claim to ultimate truth:
mysticism and belief in special revelation are foreign to it. Finally,
Marxism, as it exists in America, lacks the societal support and cere-
in any earlier age, of our human destiny. That destiny is to. be the agent of
the evolutionary process on this planet, the instrument for realising new
possibilities for its future.
Biology ... has thus revealed man's place in nature.
[ T]he religion indicated by our new view of our position in the
cosmos must clearly be one centred on the idea of fulfilment. Man's most
sacred duty, and at the same time his most glorious opportunity, is to pro-
mote the maximum fulfilment of the evolutionary process on this earth; and
this includes the fullest realisation of his own inherent possibilities.
But if the individual has duties towards his own potentialities, he owes
them also to those of others, singly and collectively. He has the duty to aid
other individuals towards fuller development, and to contribute his mite to
* * * the march of evolution as a whole.
For further indication of the compatibility between the general theory of evolution and
religious humanistic beliefs, see Note, supra note 59, at 556 n.206, 558 n.211.
78. See generally Unterberger, Russia's Established Religion, 30 CHURCH & ST.
204 (1977) ("Russia's Established Religion" of Marxism-Leninism).
79. The scope of Marxism's concerns approaches that of a religion. Marxism,
with its teleological approach to history, has been said to portray History as God, class
exploitation as original sin, the coming classless society as heaven, and the proletariat
as mankind's savior. See E. ALLEN, FROM PLATO TO NarzCHE 165 (paperback ed. 1957).
See generally G. NovAcK, Huim sm AND SocuusM 5 (1973):
At one time or another most of us have speculated about fundamental prob-
lems of human life. How did our species originate? What is the essence of
being human? What lies ahead in social progress? Is freedom a delusion?




monial trappings that it enjoys in a communist state. Given the
absence of these factors, promotion of Marxism by the state will be
unlikely to induce "religious" belief in an affected individual. The
foregoing suggests that Marxism would be a candidate for the cate-
gory of establishment clause religion only in the context of a state
program that vigorously promoted it as the only valid way of appre-
hending reality. Only in such a context is it reasonably likely that
individuals would intensely adhere to Marxism as a personal belief-
system."0 Only then would the state be invading the sacred province
of religious choice.
The task of separating the secular from the religious will always
remain one of "magnitude, intricacy and delicacy."'" The analysis
suggested above may not make the task any easier, but should make
it more systematic and less intuitive. It derives its conception of
religious belief from the values that the religion clauses of the first
amendment most clearly protect: the right of the individual to be free
from state interference in forming and observing his most personal
and important beliefs."2 The free exercise clause, concerned with ob-
servance of belief, requires an inquiry into individual sincerity,
whereas the establishment clause, concerned with formation of belief,
must deal with the objective likelihood that belief will be induced.
The establishment clause is implicated, therefore, whenever a state-
promoted belief-system is likely to produce and sustain the personal
and important beliefs that the clause aims to insulate. The two ele-
ments that distinguish such beliefs from others, it has been sug-
gested, are their comprehensiveness and the intensity with which
they are held. The likelihood that a state program will instill such a
belief depends in turn on the intrinsic nature of the belief-system and
on the social setting in which state promotion occurs. Germane to the
intrinsic nature of the belief-system are the degree of its comprehen-
siveness and the strength of its claim to ultimate truth. Germane to
the social setting of the promotion are its forms of symbolic expres-
sion and the cohesiveness of the group that adheres to the belief-
system. Having suggested the possible application of this analysis
80. See note 70 supra.
81. Illinois ex rel. McCollum v. Board of Educ., 333 U.S. 203, 237 (1948) (Jack-
son, J., concurring).
82. Conscience, as the common element in all religious experience,
conceived as the recognition of moral dignity in oneself and other human
beings, is the key to the status conferred upon religion in the first amend-
ment. Establishment of religion is forbidden, not because religion was con-
sidered dangerous, but because only independent and conscientious religion,
freely developed by individuals, is genuine religion.
Meiklejohn, Religion in the Burger Court: The Heritage of Mr. Justice Black, 10 IND.
L. Rxv. 645, 671 (1977).
[Vol. 62:887
TRANSCENDENTAL MEDITATION
with respect to two broad theories that are in some ways akin to
religion, the discussion will now turn to an application of the analysis,
with far greater specificity, to Transcendental Meditation and the
Science of Creative Intelligence.
II. THE SCIENCE OF CREATIVE INTELLIGENCE:
AN ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE RELIGION
Virtually unknown twenty years ago, when it was first introduced
into the United States, Transcendental Meditation may now be
America's most popular form of meditation. 3 About 650,000 Ameri-
cans have taken the four-day TM course,84 and a reported six million
consider themselves "involved" in the practice. Over 6000 certified
TM instructors, operating out of at least 200 TM recruitment cen-
ters,86 initiate thousands of TM practitioners each month.
TM owes much of its popular success to a series of clinical stud-
ies-most conducted by meditators themselves-that have concluded
that TM produces a state of deep rest and-significantly ameliorates
several stress-related symptoms.87 With this respectability has come
official and semi-official support. TM has received favorable recogni-
tion or endorsement from state legislatures," governors,89 and con-
83. Referring to the growth in TM's popularity since 1970, one writer has called
it the "McDonald's of Meditation." Tempest Over TM, Tm, March 1, 1976, at 34.
84. 1 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AssOCIATIONS 506 (12th ed. 1978).
85. N.Y. Times, Nov. 18, 1976, at 24, col. 3 (Gallup Poll). According to one
report, TM has 1.5 million followers in California alone. See San Francisco Examiner,
July 19, 1977, at 1. TM may owe some of its popularity to endorsements by such public
figures as the Beatles, Mia Farrow, Mary Tyler Moore, and Joe Namath.
86. 1 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF ASSOCIAToNs 506 (12th ed. 1978).
87. For instance, studies have concluded that TM affects oxygen consumption
and heartbeat rates, EEG patterns, and blood lactate and skin resistance levels. The
results suggest "TM provides a rest physiologically deeper than that of sleep." J.
FoREM, supra note 2, at 59; see, e.g., Wallace & Benson, Physiological Effects of
Transcendental Meditation, 167 ScIEN cE 1751-54 (1970); Wallace & Benson, The Phy-
siology of Meditation, 226 ScIEm TIIc AM. 84-90 (1972). See generally sources cited in
H. BENSON, THE RELAXATON RESPONSE 183-212 (paperback ed. 1976). Robert Keith
Wallace undertook the investigations as a meditator and has since become president
of Maharishi International University, the educational arm of the SC/TM world or-
ganization. See note 146 infra. Herbert Benson, in an effort to maintain his objectivity,
chose not to take TM lessons and has since concluded that TM is not uniquely effec-
tive. See text accompanying notes 251-54 infra.
88. In 1972, the Illinois legislature passed a resolution extolling TM and urging
adoption of TM courses by the Illinois school system. See J. FoREM, supra note 2, at
240-42 app. A (quoting text of the Illinois resolution).
89. In 1973, Governor Marvin Mandel of Maryland proclaimed November 11-18
"World Plan Week." See Doerr, Transcendental Meditation Goes to School, 27 CHURCH




gressmen.9 " Major universities,9' as well as public schools,9" have of-
fered accredited courses in SCI that feature TM as "lab work." TM
has also won approval among governmental administrators," who
have instituted TM rehabilitation programs both in prisons and in
government-sponsored drug abuse programs. 4
While now popularly conceived of as a secular relaxation tech-
nique, TM has unmistakably religious origins. Its discoverer is Ma-
harishi Mahesh Yogi, an Indian guru and Hindu monk who has ex-
plained TM as the gift of a Hindu god.9 5 In fact, the TM movement
in the United States began as a spiritual movement. The corporate
articles of the Spiritual Regeneration Movement, for example, stated
that "[t]he corporation is a religious one [the purpose of which is]
to give instruction in a system of meditation . . . to worthy persons
sincerely desirous of leading a more spiritual life."99 Similarly, an-
other TM group, the Students' International Meditation Society,
stated that its corporate purpose was to "advance a spiritual tran-
scendental system of meditation" and identified Mahesh as its
"spiritual leader and teacher."" It is only since about 1968, when TM
organizations generally purged their papers and literature of religious
vocabulary,99 that the theory underlying TM has become a
"science," 99 and several books have appeared that declare emphati-
cally that TM is not religious, except perhaps to the extent that
90. See 120 CONG. REC. 905 (1974) (remarks of Sen. Tunney).
91. See Maharishi International University, General Information Sheet 2-4
(Summer 1973) (on file at MINNESOTA LAw RaviEw).
92. See note 153 infra and accompanying text.
93. See generally N.Y. Times, Oct. 26, 1976, at 40, col. 1.
94. See note 29 supra.
95. See J. FOREM, supra note 2, at 209-10. Although many practitioners of TM
refer to Mahesh as simply "maharishi," both "Maharishi" and "Yogi" appear to be
titles while "Mahesh" is a family name. A maharishi (maharshi) is a great sage or seer,
WEBSTER's NEw INTERNATIONAL DICaIoNARY 1482 (2d ed. 1934), and a yogi is one who
practices a method of achieving identification of consciousness with an object of con-
centration, which may or may not be a deity, id. at 2974. Hereinafter Maharishi
Mahesh Yogi will be referred to as Mahesh.
Mahesh is responsible for three major texts: MAmsH, MEDrrATIONS OF MAH I PIS
MAHfESH YOGI (1968) [hereinafter cited as MEDrrATIONS]; MAHESH, ON THE BHAGAVAD-
GITA (paperback ed. 1969) [hereinafter cited as COMMENTAmS]; mEsH, TRANSCEN-
DENTAL MEDITATION (paperback ed. 1968) [hereinafter cited as TANSCENDENTAL
MEDITATION].
96. Spiritual Regeneration Movement Foundation, Certificate of Incorporation
art. XI (as amended 1961), quoted in J. BiORNsTAD, supra note 3, at 88 app. C (empha-
sis deleted); see Malnak v. Mahesh, 440 F. Supp. 1284, 1319 (D.N.J. 1977), appeal
docketed, Nos. 78-1568, 78-1569 (3d Cir. May 11, 1978).
97. Students International Meditation Society, Certificate of Incorporation art.
II (1967), quoted in J. BJORNSTAD, supra note 3, at 88 app. C (emphasis deleted).
98. See J. BJORNSTAD, supra note 3, at 88-89 app. C.
99. See note 2 supra.
[Vol. 62:887
TRANSCENDENTAL MEDITATION
science, psychology, and religion may ultimately share some of the
same concerns.' 0
But TM is not an end in itself. According to its theorists, it is a
means, a technique0 1 that allows its practitioners to experience "the
state of eternal and absolute existence" by enabling the mind to
travel "from the gross to the subtle states of creation until [it] ar-
rives at the transcendent."''0 It is contact with the transcendent that
represents the ultimate goal. Mahesh explains that just as a gardener
must have knowledge of the "unseen root" before he can water a tree
100. See, e.g., H. BLOOMFIELD &R. KORY, HAPPINESS: THETM PROGRAM, PSYCHIA-
TRY AND ENLIGHTENMENT 98-101 (1976) (TM distinguished from prayer); A. CAMPBELL,
SEVEN STATES OF CONSCIOUSNESS 10, 43 (1973) (although TM is religious in the
"broadest sense," it is not "a religion, a philosophy, or a way of life"); D. DENNISTON
& P. McWnLiAms, THE TM BOOK 14-19 (1975) (TM does not involve religious beliefs);
J. FOREM, supra note 2, at 40 (TM is not based on an acceptance of any philosophy,
nor is it religious or helped or hindered by faith in its efficacy; rather, it is simply a
practice based on the "natural tendency of the mind to.move in the direction of greater
enjoyment."); R. KORY, THE TRANSCENDENTAL MEDITATION PROGRAM FOR BUSINESS
PEOPLE 62-63 (1976) (TM is not a religion, nor does it interfere with a religion). These
denials should be read with the knowledge that all of the authors are meditators and
are or have been either TM teachers or administrators of TM organizations.
101. The technique is said to be natural and simple, yet it must be imparted
personally by an instructor who has received lessons from Mahesh himself. See J.
FOREM, supra note 2, at 12, 40. According to one source, however, Mahesh now
"multiplies himself" through videotape. See M. EBON, THE RELAXATION CONTROVERSY
51 (1976). The initiate learns the technique in a series of four two-hour sessions at a
cost of $65 for students and $125 for adults. See N.Y. Times, Aug. 24, 1975, at 34, col.
4. After completing the initial lessons, he is on his own to practice the technique twice
daily for twenty-minute periods, although during the first year he may return to his
instructor for monthly "checking" sessions. For accounts of the TM program, see D.
Y&ELLAoS & J. LUKAS, THE PSYCHOBIOLOGY OF MEDITATION (1974); Cyan, TM Prac-
tice-A New Drug?, in TM: How TO FIND PEACE OF MIND THROUGH MEDITATION 46 (M.
Ebon ed. 1975); Meyer, The TM Empire: It's Transcendental Meditation Time, Wash-
ington Post, Sept. 21, 1975, § A, at 1, col. 5 [hereinafter cited as It's Meditation
Time].
Various advanced programs, including courses and lectures on SCI, weekend and
month-long residence programs, teacher training programs, and advanced instruction
in the TM technique, are also offered by the TM organization at costs ranging from
$45 to $1800. See Meyer, The TM Empire: TM Takes on Corporate Look in U.S.,
Washington Post, Sept. 22, 1975, § A, at 1, col. 1 [hereinafter cited as TM's Corporate
Look]; Meyer, The TM Empire: TM University: 'Bold in Its Thinking,' Washington
Post, Sept. 24, 1975, § A, at 1, col. 1 [hereinafter cited as TM University].
102. TRANSCENDENTAL MEDrrATION, supra note 95, at 46. Mahesh also uses the
metaphor of an ocean to explain this process:
A thought starts from the deepest level of consciousness, from the deep-
est level of the ocean of mind, as a bubble starts at the bottom of the sea.
.. .If there were a way to consciously appreciate all the states of the
bubble of thought prior to its reaching the surface level, that would be the




and make it green, so must a person understand the "fundamental
reality of life that lies in the field of abstract Being, in order to glorify
the whole of the rest of life."' 3
Mahesh describes the "transcendental reality" that one encoun-
ters during TM as the field of creative intelligence, or "Being."'0 4 This
"Being" has "the status of the omniscient, omnipotent supreme lord
of the universe."'' 5 "Being," Mahesh explains,
is the unmanifested reality of all that exists, lives, or is. The Being
is the ultimate reality of all that was, is or will be. It is eternal and
unbounded, the basis of all the phenomenal existence of the cosmic
life. It is the source of all time, space, and causation. It is the be all
and end all of existence, the all-pervading eternal field of the al-
mighty creative intelligence. I am That eternal Being, thou art That
and all this is That eternal Being in its essential nature.'6
This description should make it clear that SCI is comprehensive
enough to play the role of a religion in the life of an individual and
that a sincere believer in SCI could claim the protection of the free
exercise clause were the government to interfere with his practice of
TM. Whether SCI is a religion for purposes of the establishment
clause depends on the further question whether governmental pro-
103. Id. at xvi.
104. Id. at 46; see COMMENTARIES, supra note 95, at 491 ("Transcendental Medi-
tation brings the mind to the state of Being.").
105. TRANSCENDENTAL MEDITATION, supra note 95, at 25. Mahesh's concept of
Being is virtually indistinguishable from the Hindu concept of deity. See note 106 infra
and accompanying text. Indeed, Mahesh, by speaking of the ancient Hindu hymns
praising "the Being, the ultimate reality, the Brahman which is the supreme ultimate
absolute," explicitly links the two. TRANSCENDENTAL MEDrrATION, supra note 95, at
33. The similarities between the concept of Being central to SCI and that of God in
Christianity and Being in Hinduism and Buddhism formed the primary basis for the
court's conclusion, in Malnak, that SCI constituted an establishment clause religion.
See Malnak v. Mahesh, 440 F. Supp. 1284, 1320-22 (D.N.J. 1977), appeal docketed,
Nos. 78-1568, 78-1569 (3d Cir. May 11, 1978).
106. TRANSCENDENTAL MEDrrATON, supra note 95, at 21-22 (emphasis in original);
cf. United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163, 189-90 (1965) (Douglas, J., concurring):
According to the Upanisads, Hindu sacred texts, the Supreme Being is de-
scribed as the power which creates and sustains everything, and to which the
created things return upon dissolution. The word which is commonly used
in the Upanisads to indicate the Supreme Being is Brahman. Philosophi-
cally, the Supreme Being is the transcendental Reality which is Truth,
Knowledge and Bliss. It is the source of the entire universe. In this aspect
Brahman is Isvara, a personal Lord and Creator of the universe, an object
of worship. But, in the view of one school of thought, that of Sankara, even
this is an imperfect and limited conception of Brahman which must be
transcended: to think of Brahman as the Creator of the material world is
necessarily to form a concept infected with illusion, or maya-which is what
the world really is, in highest truth. Ultimately, mystically, Brahman must
be understood as without attributes, as neti neti (not this, not that).
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motion would raise an unacceptable likelihood of inducing such a
belief in some individuals. This Note has suggested that a court, in
answering this question, should consider four factors: the degree of
comprehensiveness, the presence of a claim to ultimate truth, the
association of the belief-system with religious trappings, and its iden-
tification with an organized group. These four factors in turn fall into
two categories. With respect to the first two, the court will look to the
belief-system itself; with respect to the latter two, the court will look
to the broader social context of the state's program.
A. INTRINSIc FACTORS
In the first section of this Note, it was suggested that religious
belief was comprised of two elements, a comprehensive subject mat-
ter and an intensity of acceptance analogous to that associated with
conventional religions. It is one of the basic premises of this Note that
almost any idea-be it patriotism, Darwinism, Marxism-can be
converted by an individual into a personal -religion if the individual
extrapolates from that idea a comprehensive set of implications and
adopts that developed belief-system as his ultimate reality. But it
seems reasonable to conclude that the less "construction" the indi-
vidual must perform to satisfy those requirements, that is, the more
that is provided a priori by the belief-system itself, the more likely it
is that an individual may actually accept the doctrine as his religion.
Thus, the more comprehensive the system, the less the adherent must
add to enable it to play that role in his life that is played by religion.
Similarly, the stronger the claim to ultimate truth that the belief-
system makes, the easier it is for the individual to adopt that system
as descriptive of his ultimate reality: it is always easier to believe that
something suprarational is true because some distant prophet has
had a revelation than it is to construct a faith on one's own.
With regard to its degree of comprehensiveness, there is little
that a potential adherent need add to SCI to make it fully as compre-
hensive as conventional religions.' SCI provides the potential be-
liever with an explanation of the fundamental mystery: the nature of
existence. Moreover, it has the potential to permeate not only the way
the individual orders reality, but also the way in which he acts, for
contact with Being, achievable through TM, purportedly enables one
to cope with life's problems"8 and provides new significance to any
107. The comprehensiveness of SCI's subject matter helps explain the hostile
response it has evoked from those of traditional faiths. See note 140 infra.
108. "The cause of mental and physical suffering in the world is the lack of
knowledge of the Being and ignorance of the fact that by infusing the value of the Being
into the mind, body, and the environment, the very cause of all disease and suffering




A further indication of SCI's religious nature is that it makes a
clear claim to ultimate truth. As explained by Mahesh, SCI by its
terms purports to describe the "real" nature of existence."' Those
who reject that explanation are considered ignorant or benighted, not
in any derisive sense, but with the attitude of one who believes he has
access to a reality as yet unrevealed to others."'
This claim to ultimate truth is buttressed by reference to a divine
revelation. The source of the revelation is the Bhagavad-Gita, a
Hindu scripture recounting the battlefield dialogue between Lord
Krishna (an incarnation of Vishnu, the second person of a divine
trinity) and Arjuna, the greatest warrior of his day. In verse 45 of
chapter two, Krishna exhorts, "Be without the three gunas, [be with-
out activity], 0 Arjuna, freed from duality, ever firm in purity, inde-
pendent of possessions, possessed of the Self.""' Although there are
many interpretations of the Bhagavad-Gita, Mahesh has an interpre-
tation of his own:
Arjuna should bring his attention from the gross planes of experi-
ence, through the subtle planes and thus to the subtlest plane of
experience; transcending even that subtlest plane, he will be com-
pletely out of the relative field of life, out of the three gunas. So the
Lord's words: 'Be without the three gunas', reveal the secret of arriv-
ing at the state of pure consciousness.' 13
In Mahesh's view, the words of Krishna suggest "a technique that
enables every man to come to the great treasure-house within himself
and so rise above all sorrows and uncertainties in life.""' 4 As Mahesh
later makes clear, the "technique" is TM."1 Thus TM and, by impli-
109. [Maharishi International University] students are introduced to
the fundamental principles of many fields, from physics and philosophy to
literature and economics, all organized and illumined by the Science of
Creative Intelligence. It is for this reason that the MIU first-year curriculum
is entitled "A Vison of All Disciplines in the Light of the Science of Creative
Intelligence."
MAHARISHI INTERNATIONAL UNIVERSrrY, BuLi&rnl OF INFORMATION, 1977-78, at 8 (1977).
110. See COMMENTARIES, supra note 95, at 228-29 ("[R]ealization of the state of
all knowledge [through TM] is the only way to salvation and success in life; there is
no other way."); TRNSCENDFNTAL MEDITATION, supra note 95, at 96 ("Only the regular
practice of transcendental deep meditation brings a man to that status where he finds
himself placed in the situation in which the almighty power of nature works for him.").
111. See, e.g., COMMENTARIFS, supra note 95, at 319 ("[M]editation is a process
which reveals Reality to the ignorant .... [Ilt brings faith to the faithless and
dispels the doubts in the mind of the sceptic by providing direct experience of Real-
ity.").
112. Id. at 126.
113. Id. at 129.
114. Id. at 131.
115. Id. at 137.
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cation, its underlying cosmology, SCI, are given the imprimatur of
divine truth.
B. ExTRINsIc FACTORS
In positing a dogmatic explanation of the universe and the indi-
vidual's role within it, SCI bears the characteristics of religious doc-
trine. The social context in which it is found indicates that it also
functions as a religion. Proponents of TM might argue that SCI can-
not be a religion because it lacks many of the trappings normally
associated with conventional religions. They might, for instance,
point out that SCI involves no clergy, no group ritual, no congrega-
tional meetings, nor any specific moral code."' Such arguments can
be evaluated on two levels. First, it appears that in many respects
they are simply inaccurate. TM instructors, who initiate new medita-
tors and occasionally check on their progress, are associated directly
with the founder of the TM movement;' 7 in performing the puja and
in teaching TM as a means to achieve bliss, they perform functions
roughly analogous to those performed by clergy. Moreover, while
meditators do not periodically congregate to perform group rituals,
they are invited to attend lectures on SCI, to participate in
"residence programs," and to experiment with group meditation."'
Finally, it appears that, in fact, SCI/TM does have something like a
moral code in that TM purportedly produces a spontaneous apprecia-
tion of right and wrong."'
116. See Malnak v. Mahesh, 440 F. Supp. 1284, 1326 (D.N.J. 1977), appeal
docketed, Nos. 78-1568, 78-1569 (3d Cir. May 11, 1978).
117. See notes 244-45 infra and accompanying text.
118. See note 101 supra. See generally D. KANELAKos & J. LuKs, supra note
101, at 123-25 app. B.
119. See, e.g., TRmAscENDENTAL MEnrrATION, supra note 95, at 228 ("If the tran-
scendental deep meditation is given to all students, they will grow in a right sense of
values and be citizens of their country with a broad vision of life and a right, true sense
of judgment of right and wrong.").
At Maharishi International University, students are asked to observe a strict code
of dress and behavior. According to a Washington Post account, applicants to MIU
must submit a recommendation from a TM teacher, evaluating the "applicant's devo-
tion to meditating, his participation in local TM center's activities, [and] his 'clarity
of understanding of principles' of TM and SCI." The teacher must also confirm that
the applicant has a "neat, acceptable appearance." The applicant himself must list
his TM-related activities and describe TM's impact on his life. TM University, supra
note 101, § A, at 5, col. 2. The MIU student handbook reveals additional elements of
a moralistic code: since " 'each student represents maharishi and the World Plan in
the eyes of his fellow students, the community and indeed the world,. . each should
display the highest degree of dignity and propriety in his private life and his social
behavior, both on campus and off . . . .' "The handbook continues, " 'As the future
leaders of the world, MIU students are expected to honor the society's tradition of
dignified dress and grooming.'" No drugs or alcoholic beverages are allowed on cam-
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In a larger sense, however, these arguments are irrelevant. There
are no particular activities that will provide a basis for automatic
determinations of whether a belief-system is religious. The relevant
question is not whether SCI/TM possesses or lacks certain ecclesiasti-
cal forms, but whether the activities associated with it create the
likelihood of religious belief in SCI.
Like many religious rituals, TM is a physically passive routine,
performed with the eyes closed. The mind is permitted to drift be-
yond the bounds of ordinary rational or sensory experience. TM's
appearance and the regularity with which it is performed closely
resemble the silent meditation or prayer of traditional religion. In-
deed, insofar as the purported effect of TM is to put the practitioner
in contact with the force that orders the universe, 2 ' the analogy to
prayer is compelling. Moreover, TM's Sanskrit mantras, even if they
have no religious denotation,' 2' have a centuries-old relationship with
Hinduism and Buddhism.'1 This relationship increases the likeli-
pus, nor is smoking allowed in public places. Id. at col. 6 (quoting MIU Student
Handbook).
120. See notes 101-06 supra and accompanying text.
121. Investigators of TM have speculated that there are exactly seventeen man-
tras, see The TM Craze: Forty Minutes to Bliss, supra note 29, at 91, and one source
has claimed that at least seven of the TM mantras "refer to Hindu gods and goddesses
[whose names] are used in Vedic worship rites." Fulton, supra note 3, at 1125.
One Hindu scholar, however, has stated that the mantras with which he is familiar
are not the names of deities but rather have meanings that are totally mundane. For
instance, he said that one reputed TM mantra, "shyam," means a "dark-colored
person." Affidavit of K. L. Seshagiri Rao at 3, (on file at MoNNEsoTA LAW REvIEW)
Malnak v. Mahesh, 440 F. Supp. 1284 (D.N.J. 1977), appeal docketed, Nos. 78-1568,
78-1569 (3d Cir. May 11, 1978).
122. In Hindu and Buddhist tradition, mantras have customarily had definite
religious connotations. OM, the mantra par excellence, is identified with all the great
Hindu gods. See M. ELIADE, YOGA, IMMORTALITY, AND FREEDOM 212 (2d ed. 1969). One
student of Hinduism has written:
A mantra may, or may not, convey on its face its meaning. Bija (seed)
mantra, such as AiG, Kir, Hrn, have [sic] no meaning, according to the
ordinary use of language. The initiate, however, knows that their meaning
is the own form . . . of the particular [deity], whose mantra they are ....
Every mantra is, then, a form . . . of the Brahman ....
. .Though the purpose of worship (puja) . . . and that of the
[mantra] are the same, the latter is far more powerful . . . . The special
mantra which is received in initiation . . . is the blija or seed mantra, sown
in the field of the . . . heart.
J. WOODROFFE, INTRODUCTION TO TANTRA SIsTRA 84-85 (3d ed. 1956). Mircea Eliade has
written that Hindu tradition raised mantras to the "dignity of a vehicle of salvation"
and that their
unlimited efficacy .. . is owing to the fact that they are (or at least, if
correctly recited, can become) the "objects" they represent. Each god, for
example, and each degree of sanctity have a bija-mantra, a "mystical
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hood that a practitioner of TM will attribute some religious signifi-
cance to his practice. Finally, TM has recently been associated with
the claim that it enables its practitioners to perform such
"supernormal feats," or "siddhis," 12 as flying, levitating, and disap-
pearing. 24 Regardless of the veracity of such claims, siddhis are by
definition supernatural and must for the adherent to TM enhance its
significance beyond the mundane and secular.
Another ritual associated with SCI is TM's initiation ceremony,
or puja.'2 The puja is performed by a TM instructor in an atmosphere
of candlelight and burning incense. The initiate is asked to bring to
the ceremony flowers, fruit, and a white handkerchief, all chosen for
their symbolic meaning.2 ' The instructor places these items on a
cloth-covered table supporting a framed portrait of Jai Guru Dev,
Mahesh's teacher and the man whom he credits with "rediscovering"
the TM technique.'2 The initiate is asked to remove his shoes before
sound," which is their "seed," their "support"-that is, their very being. By
repeating this bija-mantra in accordance with the rules,- the practitioner
appropriates its ontological essence, concretely and directly assimilates the
god, the state of sanctity ....
M. ELUDE, supra at 215. Another student has written:
The mantras are instruments. Partly they are without meaning and often
they are not understood by him who reads them. They have fixed places in
the ritual and varied effects and cannot be interchanged.
[Mantras] hold the gods and can be directed. . . . In that way the
performer of the rites draws into himself the divine ....
C. DIEHL, INSTRUMENT AND PURPOSE: STUDIES ON RrrIES AND RrruALS IN SOUTH INDIA 94,
100 (1956).
123. On siddhis generally, see M. ELUDE, supra note 122, at 85-90.
124. See I'm the Maharishi-Fly Me, PsYcH. TODAY, August 1977, at 29;
Maharishi over Matter, NEWSWEEK, June 13, 1977, at 98; Seer of Flying, TIME, August
8, 1977, at 75. According to one of these accounts, Mahesh announced to some 900 TM
teachers, in January 1977, that it was now time "to discuss such phenomena as levita-
tion, invisibility, and mastery over the fundamental forces of nature in general." I'm
the Maharishi, supra at 29. One meditator, anticipating the benefits of such abilities,
related, "Once you have experienced the absolute [through TM]-even for a few
minutes-flying is not a very big deal. I guess I will eventually walk through a wall,
but the technique I want most is omniscience and knowledge of other planets." Seer
of Flying, supra at 75.
The International Meditation Society has released photographs of such activities,
but has refused to demonstrate them publicly. See id. Mahesh has reportedly forbid-
den demonstrations of the siddhis, on the ground that public displays would be
"undignified." Id.
125. See Malnak v. Mahesh, 440 F. Supp. 1284, 1305-08 (D.N.J. 1977), appeal
docketed, Nos. 78-1568, 78-1569 (3d Cir. May 11, 1978); Fulton, supra note 3, at 1124;
It's Meditation Time, supra note 101, § A, at 8, col. 4.
126. The flowers represent the "flowers of life," the fruit the "seed of life," and
the white handkerchief the "cleansing of the spirit." The TM Craze: Forty Minutes to
Bliss, supra note 29, at 72.
127. After the TM technique was given to Arjuna, 5000 years ago, see text accom-
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entering the room, and he stands or sits in front of the table while
the instructor sings a Sanskrit chant, periodically bows before the
table, and moves several items, including those brought by the initi-
ate, from one spot on the table to another. At the end of the ceremony
the initiate receives the Sanskrit mantra that the teacher has selected
especially for him.'
While the atmosphere of the puja and its heavy reliance on sym-
bolism may not evoke a religious response in the participants, the
experience must at least be classified as mystical. Moreover, the
words of the Sanskrit chant are explicitly religious, invoking various
Hindu deities and figures in the TM tradition.'29 As such, the chant
panying notes 112-15 supra, the teaching was reportedly lost and then rediscovered by
Buddha. Obscured by Buddha's followers, the true teaching was rediscovered by Shan
Kara, a great interpreter of the Hindu scriptures, about 2500 years ago. Obscured once
more by misuse and neglect, the teaching was revived in modem times by Mahesh's
own teacher, Swami Brahmananda Saraswati, or Guru Dev. See J. Foam, supra note
2, at 203-04. It is this history of recurrent loss and rediscovery that has apparently led
Mahesh to believe that the "purity" of the teaching must be preserved, even at the
cost of limiting its immediate spread. To ensure that the practice remains pure, teach-
ers of TM must be authorized only by Mahesh.
128. The source of the instructor's ability to select a mantra peculiarly suited to
the initiate's personality after only casual acquaintance with him is unknown. One
possibility is that the instructor relies on a questionnaire that the initiate is required
to fill out to select the mantra generally considered best for a person of that particular
occupation, with those particular sleeping habits, and so forth. See It's Meditation
Time, supra note 101, § A, at 8, col. 5.
Although the initiate must sign a form promising never to reveal his mantra to
anyone, some meditators have reneged. Examples of Sanskrit sounds reportedly used
as TM mantras (transliterated from the Sanskrit) include: ing, inga, ima, iama, shar-
ling, shring, shamuth, sherim, hime, ram, kirim, shyam, and shri ram. See Fulton,
supra note 3, at 1125; TM University, supra note 101, § A, at 5, col. 1.
129. An English translation of the puja chant, entered into evidence in the
Malnak case, reads as follows:
"Invocation
Whether pure or impure, where purity or impurity is permeating everywhere,
whoever opens himself to the expanded vision of unbounded awareness gains
inner and outer purity.
Invocation
To Lord Narayana, to lotus-born Brahma the Creator, to Vashishtha, to
Shakti and his son Parashar,
To Vyasa, to Shukadeva, to the great Gaudapada, to Govinda, ruler among
the yogis, to his disciple,
Shri Shankaracharya, to his disciples Padma Pada and Hasta Malaka
And Trotakacharya and Vartika-Kara, to others, to the tradition of our
Master, I bow down.
To Shankaracharya the redeemer, hailed as Krishna and Badarayana, to the
commentator of the Brahma Sutras, I bow down. To the glory of the Lord I
bow down again and again, at whose door the whole galaxy of gods pray [sic]
for perfection day and night.
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is not significantly different from a prayer recited in Latin.
Proponents of TM might argue that, regardless of SCI's religious
nature, TM should not itself be considered religious inasmuch as it
is totally severable from its underlying theory. That is, TM can be
taught, practiced, and enjoyed without reference to SCI.' Similarly,
the puja may be interpreted in secular as well as religious terms.
Although "puja" originally meant worship 1 ' and denoted a Hindu
Skilled in dispelling the cloud of ignorance of the people, the gentle eman-
cipator, Brahmananda Sarasvati, the supreme teacher, full of brilliance,
Him I bring to my awareness.
Offering the invocation of the lotus feet of Shri Guru Dev, I bow down.
Offering a seat to the lotus feet of Shri Guru Dev, I bow down.
Offering an ablution to the lotus feet of Shri Guru Dev, I bow down.
Offering a cloth to the lotus feet of Shri Guru Dev, I bow down.
Offering a sandalpaste to the lotus feet of Shri Guru Dev, I bow down.
Offering full rice to the lotus feet of Shri Guru Dev, I bow down.
Offering a flower to the lotus feet of Shri Guru Dev, I bow down.
Offering incense to the lotus feet of Shri Guru Dev, I bow down.
Offering light to the lotus feet of Shri Guru Dev, I bow down.
Offering water to the lotus feet of Shri Guru Dev, I bow down.
Offering fruit to the lotus feet of Shri Guru Dev, I bow down.
Offering water to the lotus feet of Shri Guru Dev, I bow down.
Offering a betel leaf to the lotus feet of Shri Guru Dev, I bow down.
Offering a coconut to the lotus feet of Shri Guru Dev, I bow down.
Offering camphor light
White as camphor, kindness incarnate, the essence of creation garlanded
with Brahman, ever dwelling in the lotus of my heart, the creative impulse
of cosmic life, to That, in the form of Guru Dev, I bow down.
Guru Dev, Shri Brahmananda, bliss of the Absolute, transcendental joy,
the Self-Sufficient, the embodiment of pure knowledge which is beyond
and above the universe like the sky, the aim of 'Thou art That' and other
such expressions which unfold eternal truth, the One, the Eternal, the Pure,
the Immovable, the Witness of all intellects, whose status transcends
thought, the Transcendent along with the three gunas, the true preceptor,
to Shri Guru Dev, I bow down.
The blinding darkness of ignorance has been removed by applying the balm
of knowledge. The eye of knowledge has been opened by Him and therefore,
to Him, to Shri Guru Dev, I bow down.
Offering a handful of flowers to the lotus feet of Shri Guru Dev, I bow down."
440 F. Supp. at 1306-07 (brackets in original). This partial translation is similar to
those that have appeared in other sources. See Fulton, supra note 3, at 1124; The TM
Craze: Forty Minutes to Bliss, supra note 29, at 74.
130. See A. CAMBELL, supra note 100, at 11 ("Transcendental meditation is
complete in itself. Being entirely practical, it does not depend upon belief or accept-
ance of theories; all that is needed for successful practice is a simple willingness to
experiment.").
131. WEmSTER's NE W INTENAnONAL DiMcONARY 2008 (2d ed. 1934).
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religious ceremony, the term is also used outside of Hinduism to
denote a traditional ceremony of gratitude to persons living or dead."'
Moreover, for the typical initiate, who plays no active role in the
ceremony and is unlikely to understand the religious terminology of
the Sanskrit chant, the puja may have little or no religious signifi-
cance.' Even for the initiate who understands the terminology, the
words may have no more religious significance than does the reference
to Greek deities in the Hippocratic Oath.
Such an argument fails, however, because it emphasizes immedi-
ate, subjective perceptions. While a focus on the actual belief of a
practice's participants is appropriate in applying a test for religion
in the free exercise context, in an establishment clause case the focus
is on the likelihood that the practice will promote religious belief.lu
The ceremonies themselves, by implying a link to ultimate reality
and by giving a particular practice a suprarational, mystical signifi-
cance, have a marked tendency to induce religious belief. A person
who begins TM with only secular motivation may, after experiencing
success with it, explore its theoretical underpinnings and come to
believe, with Mahesh, that "Transcendental Meditation is a path to
God." 131 In fact, it appears that such is both an expectation and a goal
of the TM program generally. In his commentaries on the Bhagavad-
Gita, Mahesh states that, for the person who has faith,
"[m]editation is a process which provides increasing charm at every
step on the way to the Transcendent. The experience of this charm
causes faith to grow." 3 ' Even for the person who does not yet have
faith, Mahesh maintains that the practice "can be started from what-
ever level of faith a man may have, for it brings faith to the faithless
and dispels the doubts in the mind of the sceptic by providing direct
experience of Reality.' 37
A final argument supporting TM's claim to secularity empha-
sizes its compatibility with traditional religions.'38 TM is reportedly
practiced by members of diverse faiths, and Mahesh claims that
132. See generally Malnak v. Mahesh, 440 F. Supp. 1284, 1309-10 (D.N.J. 1977),
appeal docketed, Nos. 78-1568, 78-1569 (3d Cir. May 11, 1978); FUNK & WAGNALLs NEW
STANDARD DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 1928 (rev. ed. 1964) (spelled "pooja").
133. See generally Malnak v. Mahesh, 440 F. Supp. 1284, 1311 (D.N.J. 1977),
appeal docketed, N4os. 78-1568, 78-1569 (3d Cir. May 11, 1978).
134. See notes 64-67 supra and accompanying text.
135. MEDITATIONS, supra note 95, at 59, quoted in LaMore, supra note 29, at 1135.
136. CommENTARMEs, supra note 95, at 317.
137. Id. at 319.
138. Some find TM not only compatible with but complementary to their faiths.
See, e.g., D. DENNISTON & P. McWILLIAMS, supra note 100, at 16-18 (correspondence
from rabbi, priest, and minister, each recommending TM and denying any conflict
between it and his faith).
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it does not matter whether they call themselves Christian, Moham-
medan, Hindu, or Buddhist. . . .On the gross level of life these
names carry significance, but on the level of Being, they all have the
same value.
.. .The key to fulfillment of every religion is found in the
regular practice of transcendental deep meditation. 3'
Whether TM is indeed compatible with conventional religious faith
is a matter of sharp dispute."' But even if it were, TM's nonsectarian
nature would be of questionable constitutional significance. That a
concept is compatible with many religious faiths does not make it
nonreligious. For example, the Bible-reading program in School Dis-
trict v. Schempp4 was purportedly compatible with many religious
faiths.' But as Justice Brennan explained in concurrence, "[tihere
are persons in every community-often deeply devout-to whom any
version of the Judaeo-Christian Bible is offensive."" 3 Much the same
can be said of the nondenominational prayer in Engel v. Vitale:", any
prayer, no matter how general, is so clearly connected with recogniza-
bly religious world views' that it increases the likelihood that its
observers and participants will develop a belief in the belief-system
with which it is connected.
Further enhancing the likelihood that a participant in a state-
sponsored SCI/TM program will develop a religious belief in SCI is
the nature of the large network of organizations that actively promote
it.' Each organization was founded and is directed by Mahesh. The
139. TANSCEND zENrT MEDrrAnON, supra note 95, at 254-55.
140. The claim that TM is religious often comes from fundamentalist Christians
and Jews who consider TM a neo-Hindu practice antithetical to their faiths. See,
e.g., J. BJORNSTAD, supra note 3, at 24-25 ("When one practices TM one is serving and
adoring Brahman.") (In Hindu theology, Brahman is the Creator and Supreme Spirit
that pervades the universe.); G. LEwis, supra note 3, at 21 ("Any Christian who at-
tempts to practice TM with any understanding of its objective becomes unfaithful to
the Bible's transcendent, tri-personal Creator, Redeemer and Counselor."); Beware of
TM, 19 CHRIswm TODAY 1168 (1975) ("TM is permeated with the Hindu life and
world view."). It would be overly simplistic, however, to attribute this critique of TM
exclusively to Christians and Jews, for it has also come from nonsectarian sources. See,
e.g., Up, Up and Away, 30 CHURCH & ST. 150 (1977).
141. 374 U.S. 203 (1963).
142. See id. at 281-82 (Brennan, J., concurring).
143. Id. at 283 (emphasis added).
144. 370 U.S. 421 (1962).
145. See id. at 424-25, 430.
146. Reporting on the sophistication of what it called the "TM Empire," the
Washington Post noted that "[tihe TM organization comes complete with the organi-
zational trappings of corporate America: computerized mailings, high-speed communi-
cations links, even a well-turned medical and life insurance plan for its employees."
TM's Corporate Look, supra note 101, § A, at 1, col. 2.
The "TM Empire" now consists of no less than seven distinct organizations, all
operating as agencies of the TM parent corporation, the World Plan Executive Council.
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most ambitious of Mahesh's projects is the World Plan, which con-
templates the establishment of 3600 TM centers worldwide." 7 The
Plan's visionary goal is to bring about "enlightened consciousness"
through the use of TM. 115 Mahesh believes that practitioners of the
TM technique pass their peaceful feelings on to others and that one
percent of the population, by practicing TM, could inaugurate a
"phase transition from an age of distress and disharmony to an Age
of Enlightenment.""' Mahesh's groups began their foray into the
educational field at least as early as 1972, when a TM program re-
ceived approximately $20,000 in federal aid "to study the possible
applications of SCI and TM in secondary education."'10 Coordinating
the study was Maharishi International University (MIU). As early as
1973, MIU was able to report that "[p]ilot programs in SCI are being
planned in several high school systems. . . and interest is steadily
growing.' 1 5'
TM organizations are thus highly visible groups whose avowed
purpose is to promote the doctrine of SCI and the practice of TM. In
Four of these organizations are directly involved in teaching TM and SCI to various
groups throughout the country. See 1 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF ASSociATIONS 506 (12th ed.
1978). The American Foundation for the Science of Creative Intelligence (AFSCI),
International Meditation Society (IMS), and Students International Meditation So-
ciety (SIMS), operate out of the country's 400 World Plan centers. AFSCI conducts
symposia on SCI and offers courses in SCI and TM to business, professional, in-
dustrial, and governmental groups. IMS offers courses in SCI and TM to the general
public. SIMS offers such programs, "both on and off campus, to high school and
college students, faculty members, and to young people in general." Id. The fourth
group, the Spiritual Regeneration Movement, offers courses in SCI and TM to individ-
uals "interested in personal development in the context of a spiritual, holistic approach
to knowledge." Id. In addition to these groups, there is the Institute for Social Rehabili-
tation (TM's outreach to prison and drug abuse institutions), see San Francisco Exam-
iner, July 19, 1977, at 1, Maharishi International University (MIU) (named in honor
of Mahesh and acting as TM's academic arm and training center), and the Maharishi
European Research University (formed to investigate the "neurophysiology of enlight-
enment"), see TM's Corporate Look, supra note 101, § A, at 6, col. 1.
147. See 120 CoNG. REc. 905 (1974).(remarks of Sen. Tunney).
148. The seven specific goals of the World Plan are to develop the full
potential of the individual; to improve governmental achievements; to real-
ize the highest ideal of education; to eliminate the age-old problem of crime
and all behavior that brings unhappiness to the family of man; to maximize
the intelligent use of the environment; to bring fulfillment to the economic
aspirations of individuals and society; to achieve the spiritual goals of man-
kind in this generation.
1 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AssoCTMONs 506 (12th ed. 1978).
149. H. BLoomFIEu & R. KoRY, supra note 100, at 348. "[Ihe phenomenon of
increasing social harmony occurring when one percent of a population begins the TM
program has been called the Maharishi Effect." Id. at 349.
150. Maharishi International University, General Information Sheet 2 (Summer




pursuit of this goal, the TM organizations are eager to secure govern-
mental support. Mahesh has stated that
transcendental deep meditation should be made available to the
peoples through the agencies of government. It is not the time when
any effort to perpetrate a new and useful ideology without the help
of governments can succeed ...
In view of the great benefits of transcendental deep meditation
• . .it is highly useful that [it] be given to the people through the
governmental agencies of health, education, social welfare, and jus-
tice. It should be a practice adopted by the medical profession, by
teachers and professors in schools and colleges, by social workers
working to improve the behavior of the people within a society, and
for all the well wishers of life in every field.
Thus, the proper plan for the emancipation of all mankind...
lies in training evolved teachers of transcendental meditation...
and finding various ways and means for its propagation according
to the consciousness of the times.5 2
Given this commitment to the promotion of TM, it is hardly surpris-
ing that high school TM programs, although not yet common, have
been started in various locations throughout the country.153
152. TRANsc _ziNTAL MEDrATION, supra note 95, at 300. Mahesh's statement is
in accord with his proposal in a 1972 booklet entitled An Address to Government:" 'All
that remains is for the innovative government official to satisfy himself that the tech-
nique of TM works as claimed, and take the appropriate steps to facilitate the imple-
mentation of (SCI) programs.'" Meyer, 'Solution to the Problems of Government,'
Washington Post, Sept. 22, 1975, § A, at 6, col. 5 (quoting MAHsH, AN ADDRESS TO
GoVERNMETs (1972)).
153. See Maharishi International University, General Information Sheet 2
(Summer 1973) (on file at MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW); Transcendental Meditation
Barred From Public Schools, supra note 3, at 243. See generally H. BENSON, supra
note 87, at 154 (TM programs introduced in selected high schools in Massachusetts
and Michigan to study effects on drug use); R. KORY, supra note 100, at 84 (TM and
SCI taught in Canadian public high school); Driscoll, TMAs a Secondary School Sub-
ject, 54 PI DELTA KAPPAN 236 (1972) (TM as an extracurricular high school activity
in Eastchester, New York). Curricula guides and reports concerning high school TM
courses are on file at MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW.
Organizational efforts have been made to systematize the introduction of such
programs into American schools on curricular and extracurricular levels. Mahesh him-
self is reported to have "formulated a comprehensive syllabus for the teaching of SCI
in junior and senior high schools," and many of the 130 teachers who attended a fed-
erally funded, month-long SCI teacher training course are reported to "have taught
SCI at their schools ... as an elective or extracurricular activity in conjunction with
a course of instruction in the practice of TM provided by [Students International
Meditation Society]," an official TM group. Rubottom, Transcendental Meditation
and Its Potential Use for Schools, 36 Soc. EDuc. 851, 852 (1972).
A comprehensive SCI/TM curriculum was described by a TM instructor as fol-
lows:
[Tihe SCI course begins with instruction in the practice of TM, provided
by SIMS. On the basis of experiential contact-the applied aspect of
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The nature and activities of the TM organizations clearly in-
crease the likelihood that a person initiated into TM will attach
religious significance to it by developing belief in SCI. The organiza-
tions encourage those who have gone through the basic introductory
course to undergo further training and study and to understand their
practice of TM in light of the Science of Creative Intelligence.'
Transcendental Meditation may be marketed as a wholly secular
practice, but eventually the connection between it and SCI will be-
come clear. At this point the person sold on TM may be willing to
adopt the comprehensive philosophy of SCI as well.
Given the scope of SCI's subject matter, the dogmatic nature in
which it is presented, the ritualistic manner in which its truths are
realized, and the zeal with which its organizations promote it and
seek to influence new practitioners, SCI qualifies as a religion for
purposes of the establishment clause, because governmental promo-
tion raises the reasonable likelihood that some individuals will take
SCI to heart and treat it as a conventional believer would treat his
own religious faith. It remains to examine the question whether any
of the public school programs involving SCI and TM can withstand
constitutional challenge.
III. THE REQUIREMENTS OF NO-ESTABLISHMENT
In Everson v. Board of Education,'55 the first Supreme Court
opinion to interpret the establishment clause, the Court declared that
the prohibition against establishment meant "at least this: Neither
a state nor the Federal Government can set up a church. Neither can
pass laws which aid one religion, aid all religions, or prefer one reli-
gion over another.""'5 The Court thus enunciated a governmental
duty of neutrality in matters respecting religion. 5 '
SCI-the students inductively analyze their experience with TM and in their
lives to generate and substantiate fundamental premises that can be shown
to have universal applicability. The connections drawn between all disci-
plines clarify the theoretical principles of SCI on a level which gives the
notion of interdisciplinary studies a new relevance-familiarity based on
direct experience with the source and goal of all knowledge. . . .The possi-
bility of making education most effective in promoting individual evolution
is now providing a uniquely unifying experience for many thousands of our
youth.
Id.
154. See text accompanying note 118 supra.
155. 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
156. Id. at 15.
157. As interpreted by the Supreme Court, the policy imposed by the establish-
ment clause is a substantial neutrality that allows for accommodation of the religious
desires of the community, see, e.g., Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 313 (1952)
(allowing students periodically to leave public school in order to attend religious in-
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In the years since Everson the Court has indicated that the gov-
ernment satisfies this duty only if its actions have "a secular...
purpose and a primary effect that neither advances nor inhibits reli-
gion"158 and avoid "excessive government entanglement with reli-
gion."'"' In addition, two Justices have suggested that the govern-
ment also violates the constitutional duty of neutrality when it either
seeks an end that can only be accomplished through religious
means,"' or uses religious means when secular means would suffice.'
Each of these four tests-purpose, effect, entanglement, and
means-will be discussed in turn.
A. CLEARLY SECULAR PURPOSE
The government violates its duty of neutrality with respect to
religion if it undertakes an activity for the purpose of advancing a
particular religion or religion in general. When a court is presented
with direct evidence of such a purpose, judicial inquiry need proceed
no further; the state's action is unconstitutional. In Epperson v.
Arkansas,"' for instance, the Supreme Court was asked to pass on an
Arkansas statute that forbade the teaching of the theory of evolution
in public schools. The statute clearly appeared to favor one particular
religious viewpoint, a cosmogony based on a literal reading of Gene-
sis, and the evidence, which consisted largely of newspaper advertise-
ments and letters, suggested that a "fundamentalist sectarian con-
viction . . . was the law's reason for existence.""' Given such evi-
dence and the absence of any "suggestion . . . that Arkansas' law
[might] be justified by considerations of state policy other than the
religious views of some of [the state's] citizens,""' the statute could
not stand.
struction) ("We are a religious people whose institutions presuppose a Supreme
Being"), rather than a strict neutrality that allows no preferential treatment for reli-
gion as such, see, e.g., P. KURLAND, RELIGION AND THE LAw 18 (1962) ("religion" may
not be used as a classification for purposes of any governmental program). See gener-
ally Note, supra note 59, at 551-53 (describing "substantial neutrality" standard).
158. School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 222 (1963).
159. Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 674 (1970). Just as absolute neutrality
is not required, neither is total noninvolvement between governmental and religious
institutions. See, e.g., Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349 (1975) (upholding loan of auxil-
iary materials to parochial schools).
160. See School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 231, 280 (1963) (Brennan, J.,
concurring); McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 466 (1961) (Frankfurter, J., sepa-
rate opinion); notes 191 & 194 infra and accompanying text.
161. See School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 231, 280-81 (1963) (Brennan,
J., concurring); McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 466-67 (1961) (Frankfurter, J.,
separate opinion); text accompanying notes 192 & 195 infra.
162. 393 U.S. 97 (1968).
163. Id. at 108.
164. Id. at 107.
1978]
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
Generally, there will be no direct evidence of a religious purpose.
This does not end the inquiry into legislative intent, however, for a
program may be struck down as having an impermissible religious
purpose even without proof of religious motivation in the legislative
history. Religious purpose may be inferred when a program appears
to promote religion and no clearly secular purpose can be shown to
justify it.' e5 In School District v. Schempp,6 8 for instance, the Court
struck down a public school program that required daily Bible read-
ing without comment. The Court reasoned that even if "the Bible
reading . . . was not 'strictly religious,' the place of the Bible as an
instrument of religion cannot be gainsaid." ' Thus, since the school
authorities could demonstrate no clearly secular purpose for the Bible
reading, ' the purpose for mandating the performance of a practice
intimately connected with religion was presumed to be religious.
The state can rebut the presumption of religious purpose that
arises from religious appearance by demonstrating that a legitimate
secular purpose is promoted by its actions. In McGowan v.
Maryland,'' for instance, the Court upheld a Sunday closing law
even though the law seemed to encourage observance of the Christian
day of rest. The Court found support for its conclusion that the law
had a secular purpose in the fact that "proponents of Sunday legisla-
tion [were] no longer exclusively representatives of religious inter-
ests"'7 and in the specific secular benefits the law provided: "a gen-
eral cessation of activity, a special atmosphere of tranquility, [and]
a day which all members of the family or friends and relatives might
spend together."'' Thus, although the statute appeared to suggest
state sponsorship of a particular religious practice, the state was able
to convince the Court that its purpose was actually grounded in sig-
nificant secular considerations.
165. Justice Frankfurter suggested, in his separate opinion in McGowan v. Mary-
land, 366 U.S. 420 (1961), that while the courts were unable to discern the "private
and unformulated influences which may work upon legislation," a law's motivation
may be inferred from its "historical development." Id. at 469-70. But the search for a
law's purpose does not end with its language or legislative history; the law's necessary
operative effects themselves help to identify the purposes it serves. As Justice-Frank-
furter observed, "[t]o ask what interest, what objective, legislation serves, of course,
is not to psychoanalyze its legislators, but to examine the necessary effects of what they
have enacted." Id. at 466.
166. 374 U.S. 203 (1963).
167. Id. at 224.
168. The state's contention that the program had a secular purpose was rejected
by the Court as inconsistent with the surrounding circumstances. See id., note 235
infra.
169. 366 U.S. 420 (1961).
170. Id. at 435.
171. Id. at 451.
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B. SECULAR PRIMARY EFFECT
Even when, as in McGowan, the state can demonstrate that a
legitimate secular purpose is served by its actions, the program may
nevertheless be invalid if its primary effect is either to advance or to
inhibit religion.17 2 In Meek v. Pittenger, ' for example, the Supreme
Court struck down a Pennsylvania statute that provided nonpublic
elementary and secondary schools with loans of "instructional mate-
rials and equipment, useful to . . . education."'' The Court held
that, despite the "secular legislative purpose" behind the statute, the
direct loan of such materials had "the unconstitutional primary ef-
fect" of advancing religion "because of the predominantly religious
character of the schools benefiting from the Act.'
7 5
In Committee for Public Education v. Nyquist, 171 the Court used
a similar approach to invalidate a New York statute that, inter alia,
gave direct "maintenance" grants to nonpublic schools. The Court
noted that "[n]o attempt [had been] made to restrict [the mainte-
nance grants] to those expenditures. . . used exclusively for secular
purposes"'" nor " 'to guarantee the separation between secular and
religious educational functions and to ensure that State financial aid
supports only the former.' ,,'78 As a consequence, there was a danger
that at least some of the state aid would be used to defray the costs
of religious education, and the program was therefore invalid.
By contrast, in Roemer v. Board of Public Works,171 the Court
upheld a Maryland statute that provided public funds to four Catho-
lic colleges. The Court accepted the trial court's finding that the
colleges were "not 'so permeated by religion that the secular side
cannot be separated from the sectarian.' "I" Consequently, the stat-
ute's requirement that funds be used exclusively for nonsectarian
purposes avoided any primary religious effect.''
The rule developed from Meek, Nyquist, and Roemer is that
even when financial aid to an institution with a religious affiliation
has a clearly secular purpose, the establishment clause is violated in
the absence of safeguards to prevent the diversion of such aid to reli-
172. School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 222 (1963).
173. 421 U.S. 349 (1975).
174. Id. at 354.
175. Id. at 363.
176. 413 U.S. 756 (1973).
177. Id. at 774. "Nothing in the statute, for instance, bars a qualifying school
from paying out of state funds the salaries of employees who maintain the school
chapel." Id.
178. Id. at 783, 790-91 (quoting Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 613 (1971)).
179. 426 U.S. 736 (1976).
180. Id. at 759 (quoting Roemer v. Board of Pub. Works, 387 F. Supp. 1282, 1293




gious use. Further, some recipient institutions may be so pervasively
religious that any aid to them necessarily has the primary effect of
advancing religion.'82 Accordingly, the state may not subsidize or pro-
mote activity that is in part secular and in part religious unless the
secular and religious aspects of the activity can be readily separated
and the state can ensure that it is directly supporting only the secular
portion.
C. AvomANcE OF EXCESsIvE ENTANGLEMENT
Although the purpose and primary effect of a program are both
clearly secular, the program is still unconstitutional if it "entangles"
the state, to an impermissible degree, in the administration of a
religious institution. In Lemon v. Kurtzman,"" the Supreme Court
applied this principle to strike down a publicly funded salary supple-
ment paid to parochial school teachers who taught only secular sub-
jects. The evidence suggested that the teachers who received the
salary supplement "did not inject religion into their secular
classes,"Iu but the fact that the program did not actually foster reli-
gion did not redeem it, given its potential for doing so. ' The Court
recognized that
a dedicated religious person, teaching in a school affiliated with his
or her faith and operated to inculcate its tenets, will inevitably
experience great difficulty in remaining religiously neutral ...
What would appear to some to be essential to good citizenship might
well for others border on or constitute instruction in religion.' 8
Thus, to ensure that no impermissible advancement of religion
occurred, the state would have to subject the teacher to "compre-
hensive, discriminating, and continuing . . . surveillance."'87 This
kind of surveillance, the Court concluded, would require the "exces-
182. See Hunt v. McNair, 413 U.S. 734, 743 (1973):
Aid normally may be thought to have a primary effect of advancing religion
when it flows to an institution in which religion is so pervasive that a sub-
stantial portion of its functions are subsumed in the religious mission or
when it funds a specifically religious activity in an otherwise substantially
secular setting.
183. 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
184. Id. at 618.
185. See id. at 619.
186. Id. at 618-19.
187. Id. at 619. The Court in Lemon distinguished Board of Educ. v. Allen, 392
U.S. 236 (1968), which had upheld a publicly financed loan of textbooks to nonpublic
schools on tie ground that "[u]nlike a book, a teacher cannot be inspected once so
as to determine the extent and intent of his or her personal beliefs and subjective




sive and enduring entanglement between state and church" that the
establishment clause was to prevent.'"
In Meek v. Pittenger, 18 the Court used a similar analysis to strike
down a program that provided nonpublic schools with certain auxil-
iary services,"' even though the personnel involved were public em-
ployees who displayed no religious dedication and were subject to no
religious discipline. The Court deemed dispositive, as it had in
Lemon, the presence of a " 'potential for impermissible fostering of
religion.' "I" This potential existed because the auxiliary services
were performed on church-related property, in "an atmosphere dedi-
cated to the advancement of religious belief.""19 Because of this situa-
tion, the state was confronted with a constitutional dilemma: it had
to " 'be certain, given the Religion Clauses, that subsidized teachers
[did] not inculcate religion,' "13 but "[tihe prophylactic contacts
required to ensure that teachers play[ed] a strictly nonideological
role [would] necessarily give rise to a constitutionally intolerable
degree of entanglement between church and state.""'
D. LEAST RELiGious MEANS
A program that passes scrutiny under the traditional purpose-
effect-entanglement test is constitutionally valid even though it has
secondary religious effects. In his separate opinion in McGowan v.
Maryland,"5 however, Justice Frankfurter suggested that the state
should also have the burden of showing that its goal cannot be reason-
ably achieved19 through alternative means that minimize even the
188. 403 U.S. at 619. The Lemon Court noted that entanglement "in the broader
sense" results when state and religious officials actively cooperate in a program that
requires recurrent legislative approval. Such cooperation is particularly likely to breed
political strife along religious lines. See id. at 622-23. Entanglement in the "broad
sense" has never achieved the status of an independent criterion of establishment. Its
strongest proponent has been Justice Brennan. See, e.g., Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S.
229, 256 (1977) (concurring and dissenting opinion); Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349,
376-83 (1975) (dissenting opinion) (arguing that loans of auxiliary materials to par-
ochial schools were unconstitutional on the broad entanglement ground, despite secu-
lar purpose, secular primary effect, and lack of administrative entanglement).
189. 421 U.S. 349 (1975).
190. The auxiliary services included vocational, academic, and psychological
counseling; speech and hearing therapy; and special teaching for remedial students.
Id. at 353.
191. Id. at 369 (quoting Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 618-19 (1971)).
192. Id. at 371.
193. Id. (quoting Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 619 (1971)).
194. Id. at 370.
195. 366 U.S. 420 (1961).
196. "Reasonably achieve" means that in terms of cost-effectiveness an available
secular means is roughly equivalent to the "religious means" being challenged.
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incidental promotion of religion.m After stating that ends attainable
only as a derivative of promoting religion were beyond the power of
the state to pursue,' 5 Justice Frankfurter declared that "if a statute
furthers both secular and religious ends by means unnecessary to the
effectuation of the secular ends alone-where the same secular ends
could equally be attained by means which do not have consequences
for promotion of religion-the statute cannot stand."' 9 Justice Bren-
nan proposed a similar analysis in his concurrence in School District
v. Schempp. 20 After stating that government could not use religion
qua religion as a tool to promote secular ends,"0' he declared that the
state may not use "religious means to serve secular ends where secu-
lar means would suffice." ' Thus, both Justices Frankfurter and
Brennan proposed a "least religious means" approach reminiscent of
the least burdensome alternative test employed in free speech0 ' and
free exercise cases.20
197. See id. at 466-67. One writer has proposed the following test: "Does the state
have a compelling interest in declining alternative ... measures involving no second-
ary religious effects?" Note, supra note 37, at 99. There, as here, the "least religious
means" approach was offered as a supplement rather than as an alternative to the
traditional purpose-effect-entanglement test. See also Galanter, supra note 67, at 280.
198. If the primary end achieved by a form of regulation is the affirmation
or promotion of religious doctrine-primary, in the sense that all secular
ends which it purportedly serves are derivative from, not wholly independent
of, the advancement of religion-the regulation is beyond the power of the
state.
366 U.S. at 466.
199. Id. at 466-67.
200. 374 U.S. 203, 231, 280-81 (1963).
201. "To the extent that only religious materials will serve [an otherwise valid]
purpose, it seems to me that the purpose as well as the means is so plainly religious
that the exercise is necessarily forbidden by the Establishment Clause." Id. at 280
(emphasis in original).
202. Id. at 281.
203. See, e.g., Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479 (1960) (statute requiring public
school teachers to file annual list of organizational affiliations during previous five
years was unconstitutional, since it infringed upon freedom of association and there
were less restrictive means to achieve the state's goal of ensuring that teachers did not
spend too much time on outside activities). See generally Note,. Less Drastic Means
and the First Amendment, 78 Y E L.J. 464 (1969).
204. In Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963), the Court held that the state
could not deny unemployment benefits to a Seventh-day Adventist simply because she
would not work on Saturday, the Sabbath day of her faith. See id. at 410. The Court,
per Justice Brennan, held that even if the prevention of fraudulent claims constituted
a "compelling interest" that justified uniform application of the law, "it would [still]
be incumbent upon [the state] to demonstrate that no alternative forms of regulation
would combat such abuses without infringing First Amendment rights." Id. at 407. The
Court distinguished Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599 (1961), in which it upheld a
Sunday closing law as applied to Jewish businessmen who closed on Saturday for
religious reasons. The Verner Court explained that in Braunfeld the "secular objective
[of establishing a common day of rest] could be achieved . . . only by declaring
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Although the Supreme Court has never explicitly endorsed a
least religious means approach, it is compatible with the major estab-
lishment clause cases. In School District v. Schempp, °5 for instance,
the school authorities attempted to justify Bible reading on the
grounds that it helped to promote moral values, reverse materialistic
trends, perpetuate institutions, and teach literature."0 ' The Court
chose to rebut these assertions of secular purposes by pointing to the
Bible's religious nature and suggesting that, although there are secu-
lar purposes for Bible reading, its primary or basic purpose was reli-
gious.
207
Justice Brennan's concurrence, however, appears to provide a
sounder rationale for the Court's position by suggesting that the
government's activity was invalid because it used an "essentially
religious means to serve governmental ends where secular means
would [have] suffice[d] . ' 2°1 The secular ends that the state sought
to advance by the Bible reading could, Justice Brennan reasoned, be
realized through such nonreligious activities as "readings from the
speeches and messages of great Americans . . . or from documents
Sunday to be that day of rest." 374 U.S. at 408 (emphasis added). Exempting Sabba-
tarians "would have rendered the entire statutory scheme unworkable." Id. at 409. In
Verner, however, no comparable justifications for uniform application of the law were
apparent.
A close parallel exists between the least burdensome alternative and traditional
equal protection analyses. Generally speaking, the equal protection clause forbids all
differential treatment that impinges on "fundamental interests" or that is based on
"suspect classifications," unless such differential treatment is necessary to promote a
compelling interest. See, e.g., Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 11 (1967) (racial classifi-
cation restricting right to marry invalid as unnecessary to "accomplishment of [any]
permissible state objective"). Absent a fundamental interest or a suspect classifica-
tion, the equal protection clause requires only that the classification bear some rational
relationship to a legitimate state end. See Developments in the Law-Equal Protec-
tion, 82 HARv. L. Rxv. 1065, 1076-132 (1969).
Since state action that even indirectly promotes a religion may impinge on the
fundamental right to "no-establishment," such action is valid only to the extent that
it is truly necessary to the promotion of a compelling secular interest. This is but
another way of saying the state must select a less religious alternative if one is avail-
able. Cf. Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 696-97 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring)
(endorsing "an equal protection mode of analysis" in determining whether the state
had observed its duty of neutrality with respect to religion).
205. 374 U.S. 203 (1963).
206. See id. at 223.
207. See id. at 224; cf. DeSpain v. DeKalb County Community School Dist. 428,
384 F.2d 836, 839 (7th Cir. 1967) ("the test laid down ... in Schempp [applied] to
the facts of this case convinces us that the . 'secular purposes' of the verse were
merely adjunctive and supplemental to its basic and primary purpose, which was [a]
religious act"), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 906 (1968). A more coherent standard, it is sub-
mitted, is whether the state's promotion of a religious practice is reasonably necessary
to its secular end.
208. 374 U.S. at 231.
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of our heritage of liberty."2" Those ends that were not obtainable by
such secular means-that is, those that depended on an "immedi-
ately religious experience shared by the participating children"-
were simply beyond the power of the state to seek." '1 Thus, there
was no legitimate governmental end that could not reasonably be
achieved through less religious means.
In contrast to cases like Schempp, there may be some situations
in which a permissible state interest may be promoted only through
a method that also advances religion. The facts of Everson v. Board
of Education"' provide an example of just such a case. In Everson,
the Court held that a public bus subsidy given to school children did
not violate the state's duty of neutrality with respect to religion, even
though an incidental effect of the program was to subsidize religious
education."' A least religious means approach might well have pro-
duced the same result, for there was no less religious means whereby
the state could reasonably achieve its admittedly legitimate goal of
encouraging safety in school transportation. Limiting the program
to public school children would have frustrated the state's purpose
in promoting the safety of all school children. Tying the subsidy to
a requirement that all students attend public schools would have
been even less reasonable, both economically and constitution-
ally. 2 13
In McGowan v. Maryland,211 the Supreme Court was presented
with an argument based squarely on the least religious means test.
The parties challenging Maryland's Sunday closing law argued that
the state's interest in a weekly day of rest should be promoted only
by a means that did not encourage church attendance or require
community observance of the Christian Sabbath.25 The Court did
not reject this argument,21 but responded, in effect, that there was
no less religious alternative that would reasonably vindicate the
state's legitimate interest in a common day of rest. The state could
reasonably choose Sunday closing as the best means available since,
as a matter of custom, most people already regarded Sunday as the
209. Id. at 281.
210. Id. at 279.
211. 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
212. See id. at 17-18.
213. See Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925) (state may not force
parents to have children instructed by public school teachers only).
214. 366 U.S. 420 (1961).
215. See id. at 449-50; cf. Mandel v. Hodge, 54 Cal. App. 3d 596, 127 Cal. Rptr.
244 (1976) (invalidating Governor's order to close state offices for three hours on Good
Friday because this encouraged employees to worship if they were so inclined).
216. Neither, however, did the Court accept the argument. "[A] majority of the
Court has never employed the 'alternative means' rationale in an establishment clause
case." Choper, Aid to Parochial Schools, 56 CmH. L. REv. 260, 309 n.330 (1968).
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appropriate time for family and recreational activities. 21 The least
religious means test was satisfied because neither of the other two
choices-allowing individuals to choose their own day of rest, or clos-
ing businesses on a common day other than Sunday-would serve the
desired secular purpose as effectively.218 The former would wholly
frustrate the state's interest in a common day of rest, and the latter
would disrupt established custom and perhaps be "ill-designed to
secure the desirable community repose for which Sunday legislation
is designed. 2 19
Thus, purpose, primary effect, entanglement, and least religious
means represent the standards by which any governmental activity
should be judged when challenged as an establishment of religion.
The next section will apply these standards to several hypothetical
public school programs involving SCI and TM.
IV. TRANSCENDENTAL MEDITATION
IN THE PUBLIC SCHOOLS
Unhappily, for purposes of tidy analysis, TM programs in the
public schools do not assume a standard form. SCI and TM may be
taught separately, or together. TM lessons for students may be paid
for by the students or the state. SCI and TM may receive special
treatment in a course reserved to themselves, or appear in a course
devoted to philosophy or meditation generally. One or both may be
taught by a regularly certified public school teacher, or by a TM
instructor brought in especially for that purpose. Each of these varia-
tions has distinct constitutional implications. The only common fea-
ture of the hypothetical situations discussed below is that they all
involve some form of SCT/M program sponsored by a public primary
or secondary school.
A. A COURSE IN SCI ALONE
If SCI is an establishment clause religion, a public school course
devoted entirely to SCI, even if taught objectively, would appear to
violate the Constitution. By offering a course in SCI, but not a com-
parable course in, say, Judeo-Christian philosophy, the state would
impermissibly favor SCI and thus violate its duty to remain neutral
among religions. 0 In such a situation the inability of the state to offer
217. See 366 U.S. at 450-52.
218. See id. at 506 (Frankfurter, J., separate opinion).
219. Id. at 507 (Frankfurter, J., separate opinion). "It would seem unrealistic for
enforcement purposes and perhaps detrimental to the general welfare to require a State
to choose a common day of rest other than that which most persons would select of
their own accord." Id. at 452 (majority opinion).
220. As the Supreme Court stated in Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97 (1968),
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any secular purpose to justify teaching SCI but not other religions
would leave the court with no alternative but to presume that the
purpose is religious.2'
The possibility of preferential treatment is diminished if SCI is
taught in a comparative religion or philosophy course. In this situa-
tion, the high school administrator may easily maintain that the
school's curriculum, as a whole, is neutral among religions. Moreover,
as several Supreme Court Justices have indicated, religion is a sub-
ject worthy of objective studyYw Thus, the course may be said to
"[tihe State may not adopt programs or practices in its public schools or colleges
which 'aid or oppose' any religion . . . . This prohibition is absolute. It forbids alike
the preference of a religious doctrine or the prohibition of theory which is deemed
antagonistic to a particular dogma." Id. at 106-07 (emphasis added). While Epperson
involved a prohibition of a particular subject, the quoted dictum indicates that the
state's prescription of a particular subject may be equally invalid under the establish-
ment clause.
In Daniel v. Waters, 515 F.2d 485 (6th Cir. 1975), the Sixth Circuit Court of
Appeals struck down a statute that required public school textbooks containing theo-
ries of human origins to give each account of creation, including the Genesis account,
equal attention. The statute further provided that all such textbooks must disclaim
that the theories being taught were "represented to be scientific fact." The Bible,
however, was not to be defined as a "textbook" and was not required to contain the
disclaimer. The statute also expressly excluded from its "equal time" provisions any
"satanical beliefs of human origin." Id. at 487. In striking down the statute, the court
ruled, in part, that "preferential treatment of the Bible clearly offends the Establish-
ment Clause." Id. at 491.
In a similar case, Tudor v. Board of Educ., 14 N.J. 31, 100 A.2d 857 (1953), cert.
denied, 348 U.S. 816 (1954), the New Jersey Supreme Court enjoined a Bible distribu-
tion program cosponsored by the school board and the Gideon Society, an evangelistic
group associated primarily with the free placement of Bibles in places of public accom-
modation. Under the proposed program, the school would have distributed a Bible to
each child who expressed interest by bringing a slip signed by his parent. The court
held that the active role of the school in the distribution program constituted a
"preference of one religion over another" and was therefore unconstitutional. Id. at 51-
52, 100 A.2d at 868.
221. The state could, in theory, eliminate problems of undue preference among
religions by offering separate courses in each of several religious doctrines. But it might
have difficulty demonstrating that a clearly secular purpose is served by such separate
courses that is not served by a single course in comparative religion.
222. Justice Jackson, for example, concurring in Illinois ex rel. McCollum v.
Board of Educ., 333 U.S. 203 (1948), observed,
The fact is that, for good or for ill, nearly everything in our culture worth
transmitting, everything which gives meaning to life, is saturated with reli-
gious influences, derived from paganism, Judaism, Christianity-both Cath-
olic and Protestant-and other faiths accepted by a large part of the world's
peoples. One can hardly respect a system of education that would leave the
student wholly ignorant of the currents of religious thought that move the
world society for a part in which he is being prepared.
Id. at 236; see School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 225 (1963) (Bible worthy of study
for its literary and historical qualities); id. at 300 (Brennan, J., concurring) (impossible
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advance a secular objective.
Moreover, "[c]ourts do not and cannot intervene in the resolu-
tion of conflicts which arise in the daily operation of school systems
and which do not direftly and sharply implicate basic constitutional
values."2  Where school officials have concluded that, in their profes-
sional judgment, SCI may properly be examined within the context
of a comparative study of religions or philosophies, a presumption of
constitutionality should operate, and the courts should not intervene
absent a showing that SCI is being taught in a dogmatic manner.
Only when such a course clearly favors SCI at the expense of other
equally available explanations of the universe would establishment
problems arise.
B. A COURSE IN SCI AND TM
While teaching about SCI is probably constitutional in the con-
text of a comparative religion or philosophy course, its use as an aid
to the instruction of TM is clearly invalid.2' To justify teaching TM
in the public schools, the state would have to show that TM is de-
monstrably effective in producing various psychological and physio-
logical effects; that these effects are closely related to improved aca-
demic performance or some other educational goal; and that the
state, in pursuit of its legitimate interest in improved academic per-
formance, may therefore teach TM in order to foster such effects. To
justify the teaching of SCI, the state would have to argue further that
TM is most effective when its practitioners are able to analyze and
appreciate their meditative experience in terms of its intellectual and
philosophical underpinnings. Thus, to enhance the educational goals
achieved through TM, the state should be allowed to teach SC.
This justification for teaching SCI cannot withstand scrutiny.
The state's effort to enhance the effectiveness of TM by providing
what amounts to a religious explanation of its physical effects inevit-
ably results in a promotion of SCI. Although a program fostering
positive student attitudes is generally legitimate, it is unconstitu-
tional where its direct effect is to promote religion. ' If the only way
to teach social sciences or the humanities meaningfully without some mention of
religion); id. at 306 (Goldberg, J., concurring) (teaching about religion in public schools
permissible, but teaching of religion impermissible).
223. Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 104 (1968) (emphasis added).
224. This was the sort of program declared unconstitutional in Malnak v. Ma-
hesh, 440 F. Supp. 1284 (D.N.J. 1977), appeal docketed, Nos. 78-1568, 78-1569 (3d Cir.
May 11, 1978).
225. See notes 169-75 supra and accompanying text. In Illinois ex rel. McCollum
v. Board of Educ., 333 U.S. 203 (1948), the Court found an impermissible promotion
of religion where students were released from regular classes to receive religious in-
struction from Protestant, Catholic, and Jewish teachers, all of whom were allowed to
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to enhance the effectiveness of TM is to explain it in terms of SCI,
the state must satisfy itself with less than maximum effectiveness.
C. A COURSE IN TM ALONE
While the teaching of SCI either alone or with TM strongly sug-
gests an improper religious purpose, a program featuring TM alone 2 n
use rooms within the school building. That the McCollum program could claim
"educational" and "social" benefits, see id. at 228 n.20 (Frankfurter, J., separate
opinion), did not save it since these benefits derived from religious instruction.
There are three superficial differences between the McCollum situation and an
SCIiTM course in the public schools. First, since McCollum concerned a program
involving religious teachers unassociated with the school, its holding is directly analo-
gous only to an SCI/TM course that is taught by a TM instructor brought in especially
to teach the course. The same course taught by a regular public school teacher presents
a different situation. The Court has indicated, however, that the religious affiliation
of the teacher is not a controlling factor when the atmosphere in which he works is
permeated with religion. See Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349, 371-72 (1975) (that
auxiliary staff were themselves religiously neutral did not save a program under which
the state donated their services to parochial schools). A course teaching SCI as a means
to evaluate TM could create such an atmosphere.
Second, McCollum involved "close cooperation between the school authorities and
religious [officials] in promoting religious education." 333 U.S. at 209. Although a
course taught by instructors closely associated with TM organizations would present
exactly this sort of close involvement, such problems could be alleviated by using
unaffiliated instructors (if such exist). Nevertheless, the teaching materials would
almost certainly be provided by some official TM source, and the TM course, unlike
the classes challenged in McCollum, would be a regular part of the curriculum. These
factors would appear to create as much church-state involvement as did the facts in
McCollum.
Third, McCollum involved indirect coercion, as students were compelled to attend
school and were subject to social pressures to attend the in-school religious instruction,
whereas the SCI/TM program in question is an elective course that no one, presuma-
bly, would be pressured into taking. Despite its elective nature, however, it is not clear
that a TM course would be devoid of social pressures to conform. Even if it were,
McCollum cannot be distinguished on this basis, because the absence of coercion will
not preclude a finding that the establishment clause has been violated. See Engel v.
Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 430 (1963).
More significant than these differences between McCollum and an SCtI'M pro-
gram, however, is the basic similarity: "the State's tax-supported public school build-
ings [are] used for the dissemination of religious doctrines," Illinois ex rel. McCollum
v. Board of Educ., 333 U.S. 203, 212 (1948), and religious teaching is invested with
"all the symbols of authority" at the command of the regular school teacher, School
Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 262-63 (1963) (Brennan, J., concurring); cf. Resnick
v. East Brunswick Township Bd. of Educ., 135 N.J. Super. 257, 343 A.2d 127 (Ch. Div.
1975) (invalidating lease whereby Sunday schools and Hebrew schools in need of a
building leased public school facilities at cost and below fair rental value), rev'd, 77
N.J. 88, 398 A.2d 944 (1978).
226. See notes 198 & 201 supra.
227. The textual discussion concerns a TM course in the high school curriculum.
With respect to an extracurricular TM program, different considerations would apply.
A high school policy that favored TM by allowing "TM clubs" while disallowing other
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presents a closer constitutional question. A program that concen-
trates solely on producing the beneficial physiological effects of TM
is unlikely to involve any direct evidence of a religious purpose, for
TM's supporters, in contrast to those supporting the anti-evolution
statute in Epperson, 2 1 can and usually do justify the practice of TM
in exclusively nonreligious terms. 9 Moreover, the widespread recog-
nition of TM's secular benefitsns will allow the state to advance a
clearly secular justification for a TM program. That being the case,
the state's purpose will appear genuinely secular.
It can be argued, however, that because TM, like Bible reading,
is a symbolic trapping of a particular religious faith, its use in the
public schools is absolutely prohibited by Schempp.nl Under this
reading of Schempp, once it is shown that a public school has asso-
ciated itself with such a trapping, the establishment clause inquiry
is at an end.2 2 The rebuttal to this argument is that, while TM may
religious clubs would be constitutionally suspect. See Driscoll, supra note 153 (account
of program in Eastchester, New York, that allowed TM teachers to promote TM on
school grounds and involved use of high school building for extracurricular TM pro-
grams). A high school policy that enabled all bona fide student groups to use high
school facilities, however, would presumably have a valid purpose and do nothing more
than "provide an opportunity for the voluntary expression of religious belief." School
Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 318 (1963) (Stewart, J., dissenting). But see Johnson
v. Huntington Beach Union High School Dist., 68 Cal. App. 3d 1, 13-14, 137 Cal. Rptr.
43, 50 (allowing student Bible study club to operate on public high school campus not
constitutionally permissible because it would "place school support and sponsorship
behind the religious objectives of the club" and "would foster excessive state entangle-
ment with religion"), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 877 (1977).
228. See text accompanying notes 162-64 supra.
229. See note 100 supra. If, on the other hand, a TM program were sold to a
school board on the basis that it would enlighten consciousness, reveal the truth of the
teachings of the Hindu masters, or bring the students closer to the ultimate reality of
the universe, the state's motivation would be suspect.
It might be argued that the constitutional status of a program should not depend
upon the language used by its proponents. But Epperson may be read to mean that
the anti-evolution law there in question might have been ruled constitutional had it
been passed with the stated intent of removing unusually controversial yet nonessen-
tial subjects from the public schools. See Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 112-13
(1968) (Black, J., concurring). Under this reading, the constitutionality of a program
could indeed depend on the language used by its supporters.
230. See note 87 supra and accompanying text.
231. See notes 165-68 supra and accompanying text.
232. Justice Rutledge, dissenting in Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947),
stated this view in the extreme: "[C]ourts [may] sustain appropriations only when
it can be found that in fact they do not aid, promote, encourage or sustain religious
teaching or observances, be the amount large or small." Id. at 53 (emphasis added).
For a similar opinion, see Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 439-42 (1962) (Douglas, J.,
concurring). It may be said that while this principle is subject to some qualification,
see, e.g., School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 299 (1963) (Brennan, J., concurring)
(invocational prayers in legislative chambers probably constitutional since legislators
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reflect a religious world view, it does not necessarily promote one.z3
To some extent, TM can be separated from the religion with which
it is identified, and its secular benefits are at least arguably indepen-
dent of any connection with SCI. If such a separation is achieved
and if the program is designed exclusively to serve such legitimate
secular ends as reducing tension, reducing drug dependency, and
enhancing mental capabilities, there is a respectable argumentm that
an elective program 23 in TM should not be struck down as having an
are presumably mature adults who may easily absent themselves), it applies with full
force in the public schools. See generally Illinois ex rel. McCollum v. Board of Educ.,
333 U.S. 203, 231 (1948) (Frankfurter, J., separate opinion).
233. Cf. Curran v. Lee, 484 F.2d 1348, 1350 (2d Cir. 1973) (upholding municipal
support of a Saint Patrick's Day parade and noting that, although "[tihe practice of
honoring St. Patrick may be rooted in religious belief,.., a parade named after him
is not necessarily a religious procession"); Allen v. Morton, 333 F. Supp. 1088, 1094
(D.D.C. 1971) (upholding governmental aid to Christmas Pageant of Peace, which in-
volved construction, display, and maintenance of a life-sized creche and display of
plaques explaining the pageant's secular history and purpose, since public welfare
justified promotion of certain holidays even with "strictly religious origins," and "it is
only natural that some of the original religious traditions should carry over in the
observance"), rev'd per curiam on other grounds, 495 F.2d 65 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
234. See note 130 supra and accompanying text.
235. It is not clear that even the existence of a legitimate secular purpose will
save a program involving a religious practice in the public schools. In School Dist. v.
Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963), for instance, the state attempted to justify its Bible
reading program as an effort to promote various secular civic values, see id. at 223-24,
but the Court, in effect, dismissed this contention.
Included within [the program's] secular purposes, [the state] says, are the
promotion of moral values, the contradiction to the materialistic trends of
our times, the perpetuation of our institutions and the teaching of litera-
ture. . . . [E]ven if [the program's] purpose is not strictly religious, it is
sought to be accomplished through readings. . . from the Bible. Surely the
place of the Bible as an instrument of religion cannot be gainsaid, and the
State's recognition of the pervading religious character of the ceremony is
evident from the rule's specific permission of the alternative use of the Cath-
olic Douay version [and] the . . . amendment permitting nonattendance
.... None of these factors is consistent with the contention that the Bible
is here used either as an instrument for nonreligious moral inspiration or as
a reference for the teaching of secular subjects.
Id. This portion of the opinion can be read two ways. First, it might be said that, since
ceremonial Bible reading is potentially a religious practice, any promotion of it by the
state indicates an impermissible religious purpose. The better reading, however, would
be that, given the totality of the circumstances, the Court simply did not believe that
the state's purpose was secular. If this is in fact the appropriate reading, then a
program of TM instruction is clearly distinguishable on the basis of its undisputed
utility in achieving various legitimate secular objectives. If, however, the former read-
ing is correct, it would appear that a course of instruction in TM, which is as much
"an instrument of" SCI as Bible reading is an instrument of the Christian religion,
violates the establishment clause as interpreted in Schempp.
236. Since TM reflects SCI and potentially promotes it, any element of coercion




Even if a TM program has a secular purpose, however, it will
nevertheless be invalid if its primary effect is advancement of SCI.
Suppose, for instance, that a school offers a course featuring practice
in TM and subsidizes the cost of lessons.2 In such a case, the state
would be directly financing an organization that has as a primary
objective the promotion of an establishment clause religion. The es-
tablishment clause cases teach that such support is constitutionally
permissible only to the extent that it is used solely for the organiza-
tion's secular operations. 9 Without regard to the issue whether TM
itself is truely a secular activity, it is clear that some of the state
money would be used for activities of the TM organizations in their
worldwide missions. 2 1 Moreover, even if the lessons were given at
cost, the state would be required to ensure that the religious and
secular aspects of TM were kept cleanly separate and the former
v. Board of Educ., 333 U.S. 203 (1948), discussed at note 225 supra, and School Dist.
v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963), substantially strengthen the argument that the
program is unconstitutional per se. See, e.g., id. at 288-93 (Brennan, J., concurring)
(religious exercise conducted during school hours involving all students invalid even if
students allowed to absent themselves, because of "psychological compulsion to par-
ticipate"). One might also read West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319
U.S. 624 (1943) (student cannot be compelled to engage in act he regards as religious
worship), together with Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488 (1961) (state cannot use
religious oath because it violates conscience of nontheists), to mean that a compulsory
TM program would be invalid on free exercise grounds.
237. It was apparently not the use of the Bible per se, but the failure of school
authorities to present the Bible in a secular context, that was fatal to the school Bible
reading in School Dist. v. Schempp:
It certainly may be said that the Bible is worthy of study for its literary and
historic qualities. Nothing we have said here indicates that such study of the
Bible or of religion, when presented objectively as part of a secular program
of education, may not be effected consistently with the First Amendment.
But the exercises here do not fall into those categories. They are religious
exercises ....
374 U.S. at 225.
One obvious practical difference between the program involved in Schempp and
the hypothetical program involving TM is the degree to which the underlying religions
have popular followings. Given SCI's distinctly minority position among American
religious beliefs, a court would undoubtedly be skeptical of a claim that the purpose
of a program involving TM was to promote a belief in SCI. This may, of course, be
the effect of the program, but as an intuitive matter it is doubtful that the purpose
can reasonably be said to be religious.
238. It appears that in a model SCI/TM course the students receive TM lessons
before the course from the Students International Meditation Society. See Rubottom,
supra note 153.
239. See notes 177-82 supra and accompanying text.
240. According to a Washington Post account, the "TM Empire," see note 146
supra, operates almost entirely on the course fees it charges. See TM's Corporate Look,
supra note 101, § A, at 1, col. 1.
1978]
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
wholly excluded from 'the lessons for which it paid. 4' It is not clear
whether the TM organizations are able to make such a separation
since TM and SCI permeate and reinforce each other.42 Even if theo-
retically possible, however, the degree of state supervision required
to ensure that the separation was maintained would raise insur-
mountable entanglement problemsY1
State subsidization of TM lessons for students would thus be
impermissible; but eliminating the subsidy will not eliminate the
constitutional difficulties. Any course that involves instruction by a
person affiliated with a TM organization creates a danger of indoctri-
nation in SCI. All regular TM instructors have either attended Ma-
harishi International University or participated in a special three-to-
six month teacher training program. Indeed, most have received
training from Mahesh himself.2 4 Of more significance, the instructor
has been taught that TM will be of personal and perhaps religious
benefit to everyone and is expected to promote its propagation.2 5 The
TM instructor is thus being asked to teach a subject that is an inte-
gral part of a belief-system with which he is aligned and to the spread
of which he is committed. "With the best of intentions such a teacher
would find it hard to make a total separation between secular teach-
ing and religious doctrine. '26 A TM course taught by a TM instructor
241. See Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971); notes 177-82 supra and ac-
companying text.
242. TM organizations, therefore, are more easily analogized to the church-
affiliated elementary or secondary schools whose religious mission pervades all aspects
of their programs than to church-affiliated institutions of higher education that make
efforts to separate their religious and secular operations. See generally Hunt v.
McNair, 413 U.S. 734, 743 (1976).
243. See Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 619 (1971).
244. See H. BLooMFILD & R. KoRy, supra note 100, at 153-55.
245. According to two accounts, each TM instructor signs a contract with Ma-
hesh that concludes, "I have been accepted to serve the Holy Tradition and spread
the light of God to all those who need it." J. BJORNSTAD, supra note 3, at 29; Johnson,
A Court Challenge to TM, 93 CmsTuN CEmRY 300,301 (1976). Mahesh himself lends
credence to such accounts in his Transcendental Meditation:
If all those to whom such information comes through this book would inform
their neighbors . . . that there is a way to improve the consciousness of the
individual. . . for his own benefit, and for that of all creation, it would be
a great help to humanity. There is a very great responsibility on every indi-
vidual.
TRANsCENDENrAL MEDrrATION, supra note 95, at 73. In addition, new meditators have
received a newsletter stating, "The full possibilities of TM in terms of rejuvenating
society will only be realized when the individual meditators participate more actively
in stimulating the growth of the movement." It's Meditation Time, supra note 101, §
A, at 8, col. 6.
246. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 618-19 (1971); cf. Wolman v. Walter, 433
U.S. 229 (1977) (holding invalid state subsidies of bus transportation for nonpublic




may thus have to be monitored constantly to remove the danger of
subtle indoctrination. Since the course is being taught within a public
school, such surveillance would not raise constitutional problems of
administrative entanglement,247 but the practical difficulties involved
would make it almost impossible for the state to ensure that
"'subsidized teachers do not inculcate religion.' ",24 Unless the TM
instructor teaches in a religiously neutral manner, however, the state
will clearly be promoting religion in contravention of the establish-
ment clause.
From the foregoing, it appears that the only program of TM
instruction that might withstand an establishment clause challenge
is one where any reference to SCI has been eliminated, where the
state is uninvolved in the aquisition of the technique, and where an
instructor unaffiliated with any of the TM organizations is used. The
only difference between such a course and one in meditation generally
is the insistence of the former on a particular technique. The ques-
tion, therefore, is whether that insistence is permissible under the
establishment clause.
It is clear that the necessary effect of a program devoted exclu-
sively to TM will be the promotion of SCI. One can hardly practice
TM without learning of its underlying theory. Once that connection
is made, every experience with TM is an opportunity, an invitation,
to test and explore the explanation offered by SCI. Conceptually, the
two are symbiotic: just as SCI explains and encourages TM, TM
makes the tenents of SCI more practical and compelling. Indeed, the
more personally rewarding the meditator finds TM, the more compel-
ling may seem the underlying theory.249 Thus, a program that sanc-
the individual teacher who makes a field trip meaningful. The experience
begins with the study and discussion of the place to be visited; it continues
on location with the teacher pointing out items of interest and stimulating
the imagination; and it ends with a discussion of the experience ....
[W]here the teacher works within and for a sectarian institution, an unac-
ceptable risk of fostering of religion is an inevitable byproduct.
Id. at 253-54.
Even if he is not committed to promoting SCI, an instructor has a constitutional
right to express his own views in response to student inquiries, especially when these
inquiries relate to the subject matter of the course. See, e.g., Moore v. Gaston County
Bd. of Educ., 357 F. Supp. 1037 (W.D.N.C. 1973) (teacher may not be penalized for
explaining his agnostic beliefs in response to questions by students).
247. Cf. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 617-20 (1971) (surveillance of a
religious institution held to constitute an impermissible entanglement with religion).
Such surveillance might, however, raise an issue of entanglement "in the broad sense."
See note 188 supra.
248. Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349, 369 (1975) (quoting Lemon v. Kurtzman,
403 U.S. 602, 619 (1971)).
249. This power to induce belief makes TM akin to the symbolic trappings of
conventional religious faith. See notes 72-74 supra and accompanying text.
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tions and encourages the practice of TM, even in a manner wholly
devoid of any overt reference to SCI, inevitably has a tendency to
induce and confirm acceptance of SCI. That many or most medita-
tors attach no religious meaning to the experiences provided by TM
does not ensure that some will not.250 Where such potential exists in
a state-sponsored program, the establishment implications are sub-
stantial.
Whether such potential effects are sufficient, without more, to
render the program unconstitutional is problematic. Under the tradi-
tional purpose-effect-entanglement test, the answer will depend on
whether the effects should be classified as primary or secondary. The
Supreme Court, however, has offered little guidance for making that
distinction. Indeed, it appears to be inherently unmanageable.
Under the least religious means test, the outcome is clearer, for
there do appear to be secular alternatives by which the state could
achieve its goals. Dr. Herbert Benson, one of the first to study TM
scientifically, 51 has also investigated other meditation techniques
and has concluded that "the various physiologic changes that
accompan[y] Transcendental Meditation . . . [are] in no way
unique to Transcendental Meditation" or to prayer. 22 Rather, it ap-
pears that various techniques can elicit what he calls "the Relaxation
Response." These techniques are said to share with TM four basic
elements: a quiet environment, a mental device, a passive attitude,
and a comfortable position."3 Although religious elements may be
present, they are not necessary to produce the secular benefits of
meditation. In fact, Benson suggests a simple technique, involving
the silent repetition of the word "one," which he claims will produce
effects similar to those produced by TM.24
If Dr. Benson is correct, a least religious means analysis dictates
that TM not be encouraged by the public schools since secular means
that are reasonable and effective are available to accomplish the
state's educational interest in relieving stress and improving mental
attitudes. Although public schools may offer general meditation pro-
grams, unaffiliated with religious traditions,ns they may not select a
250. See text accompanying notes 135-37 supra.
251. See note 87 supra.
252. H. BENSON, supra note 87, at 95, 161 (emphasis in original).
253. See id. at 159-61.
254. See id. at 162-63. The New York Times referred to Benson's technique as
"a demystified -version of transcendental meditation or a secularized version of
prayer." N.Y. Times, Sept. 11, 1975, at 25, col. 1.
255. See generally Opinion of the Justices, 113 N.H. 297, 307 A.2d 558 (1973)
(advisory opinion) (state may pass statute providing time for voluntary silent medita-
tion in the public schools); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 10-16a (West 1977) ("[Each]
board of education . . . shall provide opportunity at the start of each school day to
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religiously based technique where secular means exist that will ac-
complish the same purpose.
But even this does not resolve the issue entirely, for those affili-
ated with various TM organizations have challenged the significance
of Dr. Benson's research"' and the validity of his conclusions. 7 To
the extent that these challenges have merit, TM may indeed be
uniquely effective as an educational tool. If that were to be proved,
the question under the least religious means test would be whether
the state's interest in achieving the incrementally greater benefit
provided by TM sufficiently outweighs the dangers the practice pres-
ents for promoting religion.
While a definitive answer appears impossible, there is a substan-
tial argument that the state's interests do not outweigh the dangers.
First, while it is unclear what might account for TM's special effi-
cacy, several of the elements that distinguish it from techniques such
as Dr. Benson's may be duplicated by the state. To the extent that
the financial investment made in TM lessons, the psychological boost
provided by the puja, experienced and trained instructors, and group
support account for some of TM's unique effectiveness,2s the state
should be able to produce at least some of the same benefits through
its own efforts.ns If such state-created alternatives are reasonably
effective substitutes, it would appear that the least religious means
test mandates their use. " ' On the other hand, some of the elements
that distinguish TM-its underlying cosmology, the mantras, its
puja, and the unique ability of its instructors to impart a personalized
mantra-cannot be duplicated by the state. Yet these are some of the
very elements that tend to enhance the likelihood that a participant
allow those students and teachers who wish to do so, the opportunity to observe such
time in silent meditation.").
256. See M. EBON, supra note 101, at 38, 55 (TM official notes that Benson
considered only oxygen consumption, in contrast to the earlier Benson-Wallace
studies, which had used a number of physiological criteria).
257. See H. BLoOmELw & R. KORY, supra note 100, at 89-94 (studies show that
TM produces significantly lower oxygen consumption rates than does Benson's method
and that TM's time-tested mantras are safe, whereas Benson's suggestion of using the
sound "one" may lead to harm in the long-run).
258. See generally M. EBON, supra note 101, at 50, 58, 108, 140.
259. The state could, for example, require that the students make some form of
financial commitment to the program if that would improve its efficacy. Similarly, the
state could formulate its own initiation ceremony, attempt to create an atmosphere of
mutual support within the classroom, and, to some extent at least, train its own
teachers. Of course, such measures will at most provide only a partial substitute'for
their counterparts within TM. Nevertheless, they do indicate that the state is not
powerless to duplicate at least some of the factors that may account for TM's unique
effectiveness.
260. See notes 195-204 supra and accompanying text.
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in the program will develop a religious belief in SCI/TM.26 ' If it is
these elements that underlie TM's effectiveness, achieving that effec-
tiveness is simply beyond the power of the state, for benefits obtain-
able only by promoting religion represent impermissible goals. 8 '
Once these two sets of elements are removed, it is not clear whether
there is anything to distinguish TM from Dr. Benson's technique.
A second major reason for arguing that even a course in TM alone
should be held to be an establishment is the de minimis effect such
a holding would have on the state's interests. Even if TM is more
effective than other forms of meditation, it is clear that the difference
is incremental and probably of little practical import. Arrayed
against the interest in this incremental educational benefit is the
substantial danger of inducing religious belief that necessarily ac-
companies any state program that sanctions and encourages the prac-
tice of TM. While it would be dogmatic to insist that any danger of
promoting religion would invalidate the program regardless of the
state's interests, at some point the state must be satisfied with
achieving something less than it might if it could act without regard
to the constitutional consequences. Because there appear to be
secular methods by which the state could achieve much that it might
hope to accomplish through TM, it appears that such a point has
been reached.
V. CONCLUSION
As one commentator has said, a sense of "intuitively felt equity"
demands that courts "extend [the] establishment prohibitions to
groups who do not claim to be transcendental but who tend to be
generally thought of as being religious or spiritual. The criteria for
being so regarded must remain mysterious. '23 This Note has at-
tempted to explicate these mysterious criteria, suggesting two levels
of inquiry: whether the belief-system with which the state is involved
is reasonably capable of supporting religious belief and whether,
given state support, there is an unacceptable likelihood that some
participants will develop a religious belief. At the first level, the
inquiry is governed by the question whether the belief-system is com-
prehensive to a degree roughly analogous to conventional faiths. At
the second level, the inquiry is governed by the belief-system's degree
of comprehensiveness, the degree to which it lays claim to ultimate
truth, the degree to which it is supported and identified by symbolic
261. See notes 101-15 & 120-45 supra and accompanying text.
262. See notes 198 & 201 supra. See generally Dixon, Religion, Schools, and the
Open Society: A Socio-Constitutional Issue, 13 J. PuB. L. 267 (1964).
263. Hollingsworth, Constitutional Religious Protection: Antiquated Oddity or
Vital Reality?, 34 Omo ST. L.J. 15, 112 (1973).
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trappings, and the degree to which it is associated with and promoted
by a visible, organized group.
Under this analysis, SCI clearly qualifies as an establishment
clause religion. First, SCI offers a suprarational explanation of the
universe and the individual's role within it that is no less comprehen-
sive than, and indeed is very similar to, that offered by many of the
world's conventional faiths. Second, SCI lays claim to ultimate truth,
through the words of its principal exponent, through the use of my-
thology, and through a transcendental experience that is said to au-
thenticate its principles. Third, SCI has various trappings, princi-
pally the puja and TM itself, that not only resemble traditional reli-
gious ritual but may also be functionally religious for some people.
Finally, SCI and TM are associated with well organized and highly
visible groups, whose avowed purpose is to promote SCI/TM world-
wide, both privately and through the use of governmental agencies.
Given the existence of these attributes, the promotion of SCI/TM
by the government threatens to undermine the principal value that
the establishment clause is designed to serve: freedom of religious
choice. As a consequence, SCI must be classified as an establishment
clause religion, and its permissible place in public schools, if any
there be, is almost certainly limited to a course in comparative reli-
gion or philosophy.
For a program teaching TM alone, the constitutional outcome is
not so clear. While a legitimate secular purpose may reasonably be
advanced to justify such a program, there remain significant prob-
lems in terms of primary effect and entanglement. Even were school
officials to purge a TM program of its obvious associations with SCI
and use instructors with no "religious" commitment to TM or its
underlying theory, such problems would persist since, regardless of
how the program is presented, the connection between TM and SCI
will inevitably be made. This connection will lead the public to be-
lieve that the state, in teaching TM, is in fact promoting a particular
religion. There is also the danger that no matter how well insulated
TM is from SCI, a TM program will have the effect of. inducing
religious belief. By creating interest in and giving at least implicit
state approval to a practice that has religious implications, the state
provides an incentive to the participant to delve more deeply, if pri-
vately, into the underlying philosophy-an incentive that presum-
ably grows stronger the more effective the practice is.
The inevitable advancement of SCI that will accompany any
program endorsing TM might be tolerable if there were no other
means by which the state might pursue its interest in effective relaxa-
tion. It appears, however, that such is not the case. Certainly secular
meditation techniques achieve at least some of the advantages of
TM. Moreover, once TM is purged of its connections with SCI, there
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is little that distinguishes it from those secular alternatives.
Even if it does appear that TM, severed from SCI, can offer
important benefits unobtainable through less religious means, the
question remains whether the state may legitimately seek those bene-
fits. If the incremental benefit provided by the choice of TM over an
alternative technique is the result of TM's religious nature, then such
a benefit is beyond the power of the state to seek, for the state cannot
pursue goals through means that depend on the advancement of reli-
gion for their effectiveness. If the incremental benefit is the result of
factors that can be duplicated in a secular program, then there is no
legitimate reason for preferring TM and running the consequent dan-
gers of promoting religion.
A TM program would be permissible, therefore, only if the state
could show (1) that it had effectively divorced TM from SCI, (2) that
TM was uniquely effective in producing educational benefits because
of factors apart from its connections with SCI, and (3) that these
factors were beyond the power of the state reasonably to duplicate.
This, it seems clear, is an all but impossible standard to meet, and
it is doubtful whether any public school TM program could withstand
constitutional analysis despite TM's intrinsic appeal, institutional
support, and demonstrably beneficial secular effects.28" '
264. The contention, "why should a good thing like TM be excluded from the
public schools?," see Baltazar, TM and the Religion-in-School Issue, 93 CMUSIT
CENTURY 708 (1976), is a contention properly directed not at the analysis of this Note
but at the establishment clause itself. It could well be argued that schools should be
allowed to encourage or permit a great variety of voluntary religious activity, particu-
larly when it seems to produce wholesome results. But this is an argument the Supreme
Court has apparently rejected. Cf. Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 414 (1963) (Stew-
art, J., concurring) ("I think that the Court's approach to the Establishment Clause
has on occasion, and specifically in Engel [and] Schempp ... been not only insensi-
tive, but positively wooden .... ). In establishment clause terms, there seems no
principled way to distinguish between TM and traditional religious activity. A devo-
tion to neutral principles of law, then, requires that TM be largely excluded from the
public schools, despite the benefits it might produce within them.
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